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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Trial Court No. 980906287 
Appellate Case No. 20010272-CA 
Priority Classification 15 
WESLEY F. SINE, RAY D. EMERY, ROY P. 
FISHER, and WILLIAM R. FRANKLIN, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
CRESTAR BANK, N.A., DIANA GROUP INC., 
NANCY Y. CREE, and JOSEPHINE 
MANGIAPANE, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appeal from a ruling of the Honorable David S. Young 
Judge of the Third District Court 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appellants Fisher and Franklin respectfully submits the following brief: 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
Issue 1: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that the March 24, 
1998 letter was ambiguous? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 2: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that extrinsic evidence 
was admissible to determine the meaning of the March 24,1998 letter and the intent of the 
parties? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 3: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that there was no 
consideration for the March 24, 1998 letter? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 4: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that there was no 
meeting of the minds as to the meaning of the March 24, 1998 letter? 
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Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 5: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that the March 24, 
1998 letter created, at most, a conditional obligation on the part of Crestar Bank to transfer 
money to Sine if, and only if, Diana Group first deposited that money with Crestar Bank? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 6: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that Appellants' 
interpretation of the March 24, 1998 letter is commercially unreasonable? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Issue 7: Did the court commit reversible error in ruling that Nancy Cree had 
no actual, implied or apparent authority to issue a guaranty or other obligation on behalf 
of Crestar Bank? 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 
1803 (1999); Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Issue 8: Did the court abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' Rule 15(b) 
motion to amend to add a cause of action for breach of Article 4A of the Uniform 
Commercial Code that conformed to the evidence? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under a conditional 
discretionary standard. See Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc. 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1999); see also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 9: Did the court abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' Rule 15(b) 
motion to amend to add a cause of action for violation of a letter of credit that conformed 
to the evidence? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under a conditional 
discretionary standard. See Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc. 914 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1999); see also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 10: Did the court abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' Rule 15(b) 
motion to amend to add a cause of action for negligence that conformed to the evidence? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under a conditional 
discretionary standard. See Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc. 914 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1999); see also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 11: Did the court abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' Rule 15(b) 
motion to amend to add a cause of action for Crestar Bank's breach of fiduciary duty that 
conformed to the evidence? 
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Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under a conditional 
discretionary standard. See Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc. 91A P.2d 288 (Utah 
1999); see also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 12: Did the court commit reversible error by granting Appellee Crestar 
Bank's Rule 41(b) motion for partial dismissal when no findings were entered by the court 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which motion 
dismissed Appellants' claims that the wire instructions sent with the wire transfer of 
$500,000.00 to Crestar Bank created an enforceable contract or obligation on the part of 
Crestar Bank pursuant to Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code? 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed according to the standard set 
forth in Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P. 2d 467 (Utah 1999), which states, "A trial court 
is justified in granting a directed verdict only if, examining all evidence in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a 
verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Merino, at 468. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4a-101 et.seq. (1953, as amended) . . . Addendum, Exhibit G 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-5-101 et.seq. (1953, as amended) . . . . Addendum, Exhibit H 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
The central issue in this case is whether a reputable, billion-dollar bank is liable for 
inducing the Plaintiff to disgorge $500,000.00 in exchange for the bank's promise to pay 
him $2.5 million after 30 banking days. 
Appellants seek to recover $2.5 million from Appellee Crestar Bank in this action. 
In the early months of 1998, Josephine Rita Mangiapane, the president of Diana Group, 
Inc. ("Diana Group") approached Wesley F. Sine, the trustee of Appellants' trust 
("Trustee Sine"), with regard to a business transaction. She proposed that Appellants 
place $500,000.00 into Diana Group's account at Crestar Bank in return for the placement 
of $2,500,000.00 in Appellants' account thirty banking days later. Appellants rejected Ms. 
Mangiapane's offer but stated that if she could get a bank to guarantee the transaction they 
would reconsider her offer. Ms. Mangiapane was successful in locating such a bank. 
On March 24, 1998, Crestar Bank issued a letter warranting and certifying to pay 
$2,500,000.00 to Trustee Sine thirty banking days after the deposit of $500,000.00 into 
Diana Group's account at Crestar Bank. Three days later, in reliance on Crestar Bank's 
warranty to pay, Trustee Sine wired $500,000.00 to Diana Group's account at Crestar. 
Appellants would not have placed their money into Diana Group's account without the 
March 24, 1998 warranty from Crestar Bank. At the time Appellants wired their funds 
to Crestar Bank, Appellants also sent special wire instructions to Crestar Bank instructing 
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Crestar Bank to pay the $2,500,000.00 to Appellants5 trust account within 30 banking days 
without further setoff or delay. Crestar Bank accepted the wire transfer and the wire 
instructions without question or objection. Crestar Bank did not give Appellants any 
indication that it would not honor the March 24, 1998 letter or the wire instructions. 
Rather, Crestar Bank accepted the wired funds and allowed Ms. Mangiapane to draw 
against them. 
Thirty banking days came and went with no payment from Crestar Bank. Shortly 
thereafter it became apparent to Appellants that Crestar Bank had no intention of 
performing at all. Appellants therefore sued Crestar Bank through Trustee Sine (who was 
also serving as Appellants' attorney) in June, 1998 to recover the $2,500,000.00 from 
Crestar Bank. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial 
Sine's original complaint contained three causes of action: 1) breach of contract; 2) 
RICO violations; and 3) fraud. Following the filing of the original complaint, Crestar, 
and Cree filed motions to dismiss. (R. 31, 57.) Crestar moved to dismiss the fraud and 
RICO causes of action for lack of particularity. Cree moved to be dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, among other things. Sine countered by filing a motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 82.) Following a round of discovery, Sine moved to amend the complaint. 
(R. 344, 346.) The parties stipulated to allow the amendment. The purpose of the 
amendment was to plead the fraud and RICO causes of action with more particularity. The 
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filing of the amended complaint was again followed by a round of motions to dismiss from 
Crestar and Cree. (R. 435, 465.) 
Ultimately, the trial court granted Crestar's motion to dismiss the RICO and fraud 
causes of action (R. 684.) and dismissed Nancy Cree for lack of jurisdiction (R. 695.). 
The trial court also denied Sine's motion for summary judgment. (R. 739.) 
Appellants were joined as parties to the lawsuit on March 24, 2000. (R. 813.) 
Shortly thereafter, Sine withdrew as a party to the action. (R. 949.) Appellants filed a 
second motion to amend the complaint to add several other causes of action, including, but 
not limited to: fraud, RICO violations (both pleaded with more particularity), conversion, 
false pretenses, breach of Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code and breach of a 
letter of credit. (R. 1015.) Judge Young denied the motion. (R. 1200.) 
The trial of the case took place in the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department 
on January 4 and 5, 2001 before Judge David S. Young. At the beginning of the trial, 
Judge Young allowed Appellants to substitute Sun Trust Bank as a defendant as the 
successor in interest to Crestar. (R. 1273. See also Trial Transcript at 4, lines 8-10.) 
Mr. Sine was the only witness to testify live before the court. Thereafter portions of the 
video-taped deposition testimonies of Ms. Cree and Ms. Mangiapane were played into the 
record. (See Trial Exhibits 30 and 31.) In the end Judge Young ruled that: 1) the March 
24, 1998 letter was not binding upon Crestar Bank; 2) that the wire instructions sent with 
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the $500,000.00 wire transfer were not enforceable; and 3) that Appellants were not 
entitled to the $2,500,000.00 Crestar Bank promised to pay. 
Believing the foregoing rulings to be errors of law, Appellants filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following material facts are relevant to this appeal (all citations to the record 
on appeal are indicated by the letter "R" followed by the page number and citations to the 
relevant paragraphs on that page, if any; exhibits entered into evidence at trial are cited as 
"Trial Exhibit"; all citations to the trial transcript are indicated by the words "Trial 
Transcript at" followed by the page number): 
A. Crestar's Initial Dealings with Wesley F. Sine 
1. On February 6, 1998, Nancy Cree, in her capacity as Branch Manager and 
Assistant Vice President of Crestar, issued a letter to Wesley F. Sine, 
Trustee, whereby Crestar warranted and certified to transfer $120 Million 
to Sine's trust account at the Bank of Utah after 30 banking days in exchange 
for an immediate deposit of $25 Million into the Diana Group's account at 
Crestar. (Trial Exhibit 3.) 
2. The $25 Million was never acquired and, thus, never deposited in the Diana 
Group's account. Consequently, Sine cancelled the February 6, 1998 
transaction in a letter to Ms. Mangiapane dated March 12, 1998. (Trial 
Exhibit 4.) 
3. Notwithstanding the cancellation of the February 6, 1998 transaction, Sine 
and Mangiapane began negotiating a similar transaction with smaller 
amounts of money after March 12, 1998. (See Trial Exhibit 5.) 
B. The March 24, 1998 Letter 
4. On March 23,1998, the Diana Group sent a letter to Sine memorializing the 
outcome of the new negotiations, i.e., that Sine and the Diana Group would 
enter into the same transaction contemplated by the February 6, 1998 letter 
but with smaller amounts of money ($500,000.00 from Sine instead of $25 
Million and $2.5 Million in return instead of $120 Million) and with a 
different account of Diana Group at Crestar. (Trial Exhibit 5.) 
5. The next day, March 24,1998, Crestar issued a letter to Sine that warranted 
and certified to transfer $2.5 Million to Trustee Sine's trust account at the 
Bank of Utah after 30 banking days. The body of the letter reads as follows: 
On behalf of our Client, Diana Group, Inc., we warrant and certify to 
transfer to you, directly, on a bank-to-bank basis, to your designated 
account, the sum of $2,500,000.00. Said transfer will be no later than 30 
banking days from the date after the deposit of $500,000.00, to Escrow 
Account Number 206849540, Account Holder - 10321. 
The letter is signed by Nancy Y. Cree, "Assistant Vice President and Branch Manager." 
(Trial Exhibit 6; see Addendum, Exhibit A.) 
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C. Confirmation of the Letter and Wire Transfer of Funds 
6. Trustee Sine transmitted the language of the March 24, 1998 letter issued to 
him by Crestar to Dave Taylor, an officer at the Bank of Utah, on March 26, 
1998 in order to confirm that Crestar was obligated to transfer $2.5 Million 
after 30 banking days even if the Diana Group failed to have that amount of 
money in its specified account on that date. (See Trial Exhibit 23.) 
7. On March 27, 1998, in reliance on the representations of Crestar and the 
Diana Group, Sine wire transferred $500,000.00 to the Diana Group's 
specified account at Crestar Bank. The wire transfer sent by Sine on March 
27, 1998 included an instruction that read as follows: 
The receipt and acceptance (by Crestar Bank) of this $500,000.00USD wire, 
serves to reconfirm Bra. Mgr. letter dated 24 Mar.98. Said letter warrants 
& certifies Crestar's promise to pay, & transfer $2,500,000USD (via bank 
to bank wire) without protest, set off or delay, within 31 banking days of 
receipt of this wire, to the account of Wesley F. Sine, atty. Trust 
Acct.#12036086, Bank of Utah, to the attn. of Mr. Dave Tayler, [sic] Mgr. 
(Trial Exhibits 7, 29; see Addendum, Exhibits B, D.) 
8. At no time did Crestar object either orally or in writing to the wire transfer 
of the $500,000.00 or to the special instruction sent with the wire transfer 
of the funds. (R. 1-11.) 
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D. Aftermath of the Wire Transfer 
9. As a result of the issuance of the March 24, 1998 letter by Crestar and 
Crestar's acceptance of the wire transfer of funds, and because Crestar 
exercised a degree of control over the Diana Group's escrow account, 
Plaintiffs were looking to Crestar to pay the promised $2.5 Million. (Trial 
Transcript at 150, 153.) 
10. On March 28, 1998, the Diana Group sent a letter to Sine in which Ms. 
Mangiapane (not Crestar Bank) attempted to cancel the transaction 
memorialized in the March 24, 1998 letter to Sine from Crestar. (Trial 
Exhibit 9.) 
11. Though Ms. Mangiapane is not an agent of Crestar Bank and does not 
represent Crestar Bank in any way, she attempted to nullify the transaction 
on behalf of Crestar as well. The March 28, 1998 letter further states, "We 
are thus terminating the transaction; and, nullifying the bank letter provided 
on our behalf. A letter from Crestar Bank N.A., will also be issued to you 
nullifying the March 24th., [sic] letter referencing the Escrow Account. . . 
." (Trial Exhibit 9) 
12. The transaction was not, in fact, ever cancelled by the Diana Group. Nor 
did Crestar Bank ever withdraw the March 24, 1998 letter or return 
Plaintiffs'$500,000.00. (R. 1203-1221.) 
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13. Instead, Crestar allowed Ms. Mangiapane to withdraw the funds at her 
leisure, which funds were completely consumed by Ms. Mangiapane and the 
Diana Group within only a couple of weeks after the deposit. (R. 1208.) 
14. On April 1, 1998, the Diana Group wired $400,000.00 of the original 
$500,000.00 deposited by Sine to the Barry J. Marcus Trust Account in 
Hollywood, Florida. On April 15, 1998, the Diana Group wired an 
additional $95,000.00 of the remaining $100,000.00 to the Barry J. Marcus 
Trust Account in Hollywood, Florida. (R. 1208.) 
15. In the interim, on March 30, 1998, Ms. Mangiapane, as president of the 
Diana Group, Inc., entered into a Private Placement Agreement with Sine 
with regard to the use and/or placement of the $500,000.00. (Trial Exhibit 
11.) 
16. According to the terms of the Private Placement Agreement, the Diana 
Group was obligated to return $2.5 Million to Sine's trust account after 30 
banking days in exchange for the deposit of $500,000.00 into the Diana 
Group's account at Crestar Bank. (Trial Exhibit 11.) 
E. Defaults and Extensions 
17. On May 5, 1998, Sine informed the Diana Group, by way of a faxed letter, 
that the deadline to pay the promised $2.5 Million was May 8, 1998, the 30th 
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banking day following the March 27, 1998 transfer of the $500,000.00 into 
Diana's account. (R. 1208.) 
18. On May 7, 1998, Sine sent instructions to Crestar Bank about how to wire 
transfer the $2.5 Million to his trust account at the Bank of Utah. (Trial 
Exhibit 12.) 
19. Diana did not perform according to the terms of the Private Placement 
Agreement on May 8, 1998; the $2.5 Million she agreed to transfer to Sine, 
as Trustee, were not transferred on that date. Neither did Crestar transfer 
$2.5 Million to Sine on that date. (See Trial Exhibit 13) 
20. The Diana Group requested an extension of time to perform on May 8, 
1998, by way of a letter to Sine. (Trial Exhibit 13.) 
21. Sine granted the extension to May 13, 1998 and authorized Crestar to delay 
payment until May 13, 1998. (Trial Exhibit 14.) 
22. The Diana Group sent a letter to sine on May 13, 1998 requesting another 
extension of time to pay to May 15 but no later than May 18, 1998. Sine 
granted this extension of time to pay as well as evidenced in the 
correspondence traded between the parties on that date. (Trial Exhibit 26.) 
23. Neither the Diana Group nor Crestar wired $2.5 Million to Sine's trust 
account at the Bank of Utah on May 18, 1998. (R. 1209.) 
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24. On May 20, 1998, Sine demanded confirmation from Ms. Mangiapane that 
the funds were being wired on that day. The funds were not, in fact, wired 
on that day. (R. 1209.) 
25. The following day, May 21, 1998, Sine informed Crestar that he was 
looking to Crestar for payment of the $2.5 Million based on the letter 
Crestar issued on March 24, 1998. (Trial Exhibit 16.) 
26. Ms. Mangiapane sent a letter to Crestar on that same day assuring the bank 
that the Diana Group would pay the money to Sine that day and that she only 
lacked one signature to release the funds. Sine sent a follow up letter to both 
the Diana Group and Crestar that same day. (Trial Exhibit 17.) 
27. Despite two extensions of time to perform, Diana did not perform and has 
never performed according to the terms of the Private Placement Agreement. 
Neither has Crestar Bank ever performed according to the terms of the 
March 24, 1998 letter or according to the terms of the wire transfer 
instruction. (R. 1247, fl 6, 8 and 9.) 
28. The entire amount owing by Crestar is $2.5 Million plus interest at the 
highest legal rate. (See Trial Exhibits 6, 7 and 29; see Addendum, Exhibits 
A, B and D.) 
F. The Unisource Letter 
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29. Crestar issued another letter, identical in all respects except for money 
amounts and account numbers, to Zahra Ghods at Unisource Capital, which 
letter warranted and certified to transfer $2 Million to Unisource, after 15 
banking days. (The "Unisource Letter".) The Unisource Letter says, in its 
entirety: 
On behalf of our Client, Diana Group, Inc., we warrant and certify to 
transfer to you, directly, on a bank-to-bank basis, to your designated 
account, the sum of $2,000,000.00. Said transfer will be no later than 15 
banking days from the date after the deposit of $1,000,000.00, to Escrow 
Account Number 206849540, Account Holder - 10321. 
(Trial Exhibit 38; see Addendum, Exhibit E.) Like the March 24, 1998 Letter, the 
Unisource letter is signed by Nancy Y. Cree, "Assistant Vice President and Branch 
Manager." 
30. On March 30, 1998 Crestar rescinded the letter of March 24, 1998 it sent to 
Ms. Ghods at Unisource Capital, saying, "As per our internal guidelines, we 
are not in a position to make this commitment until we actually have the 
funds on deposit and written instructions from our customer." (Trial Exhibit 
39; see Addendum, Exhibit F.) 
31. No such letter of recission was ever issued to Sine by Crestar or anyone 
purporting to act on behalf of Crestar. (R. 1210.) 
G, Legal Proceedings Commenced 
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32. The final, extended deadline for Diana and Crestar to perform was June 10, 
1998. Both Diana and Crestar failed to perform on that date. (Trial Exhibit 
18.) 
33. Sine informed the Diana Group on that date that he was going to file a 
lawsuit against it, Ms. Mangiapane and Crestar. (R. 1210.) 
34. Ms. Mangiapane was personally served with the original complaint in this 
action on June 11, 1998. (R. 16.) Both Crestar and Ms. Cree was 
personally served with the original complaint on June 12,1998. (R. 17,18.) 
35. On June 17, 1998, Ms. Mangiapane wired the remaining $5,000 from the 
original $500,000.00 deposit to Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDonough in 
Salt Lake City, Utah to begin funding her defense to this action. (R. 1211.) 
H. Judgment Against Diana Group, Inc. 
36. On January 3, 2001, the Diana Group, Inc. stipulated that judgment should 
be entered against it in the amount of $3 Million, plus interest at the highest 
legal rate from June 10, 1998 to the present. (R. 1246.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants have condensed the twelve issues presented above into five arguments. 
Those arguments are summarized as follows: 
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1. The March 24, 1998 Letter is clear on its face. The trial court should not 
have allowed extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties with 
regard to the letter. 
2. Even if the March 24, 1998 Letter is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the letter. The only two interpretive choices before the 
Court were: a) that the letter constituted a primary obligation to pay on the 
part of Crestar (as Sine testified); and b) that the letter was merely an escrow 
instruction (as Cree and Mangiapane testified). Rather than choose either of 
these interpretations the trial court wrongly created its own interpretation of 
the letter, which interpretation was completely inconsistent with the 
testimony of the witnesses at trial. 
3. The trial court erroneously held that Nancy Cree did not have any actual, 
implied or apparent authority to issue the March 24, 1998 Letter. 
4. The trial court wrongly denied Appellants' Rule 15(b) motions to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence. At trial, Appellants put on evidence 
that showed: (1) Crestar breached Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial 
Code; (2) the March 24, 1998 Letter constituted a letter of credit which 
Crestar violated; (3) Crestar was negligent in its issuance of the letter; and 
(4) Crestar breached its fiduciary duty to Appellants. Notwithstanding the 
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evidence the trial court erroneously rejected each of Appellants' Rule 15(b) 
motions. 
5. The trial court erroneously granted Appellee Crestar Bank's Rule 41(b) 
motion for partial dismissal which motion dismissed Appellants' claims that 
the wire instructions sent with the wire transfer of $500,000.00 to Crestar 
Bank created an enforceable contract or obligation on the part of Crestar 
Bank pursuant to Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code. The trial 
court granted Crestar's motion when no findings were entered by the court 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and when the only evidence on the record militated against granting the 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL: IS THE MARCH 24, 1998 LETTER AMBIGUOUS? 
On March 24, 1998, Crestar Bank issued a letter to Wesley F. Sine, Trustee, that 
reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
On behalf of our Client, Diana Group, Inc., we warrant and certify to 
transfer to you, directly, on a bank-to-bank basis, to your designated 
account, the sum of $2,500,000.00. Said transfer will be no later than 30 
banking days from the date after the deposit of $500,000.00, to Escrow 
Account Number 206849540, Account Holder - 10321. 
The letter is signed by Nancy Y. Cree, "Assistant Vice President and Branch Manager." 
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At trial, Crestar argued, and Judge Young agreed, that the letter was ambiguous. 
Specifically, the court said: 
The Court: I do find that it is ambiguous. I will tell you the language that 
I find ambiguous, "on behalf of our client." That language is 
ambiguous. . . . "On behalf of your client, Diana Group," to me that 
is at least raising the question and ambiguity as to whether the bank 
is obligating themself [sic] or whether the bank is saying that we will 
do it on behalf of our client when our client provides the $2.5 million. 
Do either of you wish to focus on any other words that may be 
ambiguous? 
Mr. Wikstrom: Try the "warrant and certified transfer" languages. 
The Court: At the top? 
Mr. Wikstrom: Whether that means unconditional obligation to pay or 
something else. 
The Court: Okay, and I would accept that as ambiguous as well. It does 
seem to me that this can be read in two ways and one way is to read 
it as you are, that is that the bank is obligating itself and the other is 
that the bank is not obligating itself, and so the language is 
ambiguous. 
(Trial Transcript at 174-175.) Because the court found the letter was ambiguous the court 
allowed extrinsic evidence to come in at trial to determine the intent of the parties with 
regard to the letter. In the end, not only did Judge Young find that the letter was 
ambiguous, he found that it was unenforceable against Crestar Bank. Judge Young is 
wrong. 
In order to accept oral testimony as to the intent of the parties to a particular 
agreement or contract, a court must find that the document in question is ambiguous on its 
face. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (lfA 
court may consider extrinsic evidence if the meaning of the contract is ambiguous or 
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uncertain."). With regard to determining whether a document is ambiguous, the Utah 
Supreme Court has said, "An ambiguity exists where the language 'is reasonably capable 
of being understood in more than one sense.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, if 
14,987 P.2d 48 {citing R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1074 
(Utah 1997)). The March 24, 1998 letter is not ambiguous according to this standard. 
The March 24, 1998 letter is crystal clear on its face. In two simple, unambiguous 
sentences, Crestar Bank warrants and certifies to transfer to Trustee Sine's designated 
account $2,500,000.00 no later than 30 banking days after the deposit of $500,000.00 to 
a certain escrow account at Crestar Bank, period, the end. When taken together, there is 
no way to reasonably understand the language of the letter in more than one way. 
Contrary to how Judge Young wanted the March 24, 1998 Letter to read, the letter 
contains no conditions, requirements or prerequisites for Crestar's transfer of $2.5 million 
to Sine other than the deposit of $500,000.00 into the indicated account. Sine wired that 
exact amount to Crestar on March 27, 1998 in reliance on Crestar's representations. 
Appellants have not seen a dime of their money since. 
Nevertheless, Judge Young held that the phrase "On behalf of our client, Diana 
Group" was ambiguous. {See Trial Transcript at 174.) Judge Young said this language 
was ambiguous because it was unclear whether the bank was obligating itself to pay $2.5 
million to Appellants or whether it meant that Crestar would only transfer the money when 
Diana Group had $2.5 million in its account. (Id.) In truth, only the first interpretation 
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can reasonably be read into the words "on behalf of our client." Even when interpreting 
contracts that are ambiguous on their face, a court must give "all words used by the parties 
. . . their usual and ordinary meaning and effect." Commercial Building Corporation v. 
Blair, 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977). There is no way a reasonable person could look 
at the words "on behalf of our client" and honestly come away thinking they mean 
anything but what they say, i.e., that Crestar is about to do something for the benefit of 
its client, Diana Group.1 
The second phrase Judge Young found ambiguous was the "warrant and certify to 
transfer" phrase. Said the Judge, " . . . this can be read in two ways and one way is to 
read it. . . that the bank is obligating itself and the other is that the bank is not obligating 
itself. . . . " (Trial Transcript at 175.) Here again, giving the words their usual and 
ordinary meaning and effect, there is no way to come to the conclusion that "warrant and 
certify" means that maybe the bank is not obligating itself to do anything or that the bank 
is only conditionally obligating itself to do something. There is no way to avoid the 
conclusion that the bank warranted, certified, and therefore obligated itself to transfer $2.5 
million to Trustee Sine. No matter how badly the Court wanted to read other conditions 
into the letter they simply are not there. 
According to Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990), the word "for" means "In 
behalf of, in place of, in lieu of [and], instead of. . . " among other things. The word 
"behalf" is defined as "Benefit, support, defense, or advantage." 
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Crestar Bank desperately wanted Judge Young to rule that the March 24,1998 letter 
was ambiguous. The court's ruling gave Crestar the opportunity to have its own witnesses 
attempt to explain away the plain language of the letter. See Ward, at 268 ("[I]f . . . the 
court determines the language of the contract is not ambiguous then the parties' intentions 
must be determined solely from the language of the contract.") The letter is clear on its 
face. Crestar manufactured ambiguity where there was none. Crestar was successful in 
doing so at trial by convincing the court to look past the words on the page and ask why 
a bank would issue such a letter in the first place. Ultimately the answer to the question 
"why" is irrelevant. The March 24, 1998 Letter says what it says. Appellants relied on 
it to their detriment. The commercially-sophisticated bank that drafted it ought to be 
bound by it. 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL: IF THE MARCH 24, 1998 LETTER IS 
AMBIGUOUS, DID JUDGE YOUNG INTERPRET IT CORRECTLY? 
Judge Young interpreted the March 24, 1998 Letter incorrectly. Despite the clear 
language of the March 24, 1998 Letter, Judge Young found it was ambiguous. In so 
finding, Judge Young opened the door for extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent to come 
in. (See Dixon, at if 14) (" 'When a contract provision is ambiguous . . . extrinsic evidence 
is admissible to explain the intent of the parties."' Id., citing Willard Pease Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995).) Judge Young heard 
testimony from both Sine and Ms. Cree as to what they thought the March 24,1998 Letter 
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was. Sine testified that the letter created a primary obligation on the part of Crestar to pay 
the $2.5 Million. Ms. Cree and Ms. Mangiapane testified that the letter was not a primary 
obligation, nor even a guaranty but merely constituted an escrow instruction. 
Having heard this testimony, it was incumbent upon Judge Young to decide which 
of the two options was reasonable. (See Udall v. Colonial Perm, Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 777, 
784 (N.M. 1991) ("In construing a contract, the law favors a reasonable rather than 
unreasonable interpretation.").) An examination of the reasonableness of the two 
interpretations is therefore in order. 
A. Sine's Interpretation. 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that no reasonable investor would agree 
to give half a million dollars to an unsecured third party and expect to get $2.5 million 
back in thirty days. However, if the third party can get a reputable, billion-dollar national 
Bank to guarantee the return payment, then the transaction is legitimized, no matter how 
fantastic it appears on its face, and it becomes reasonable for the investor to proceed. That 
is what happened in this case. Appellants were unwilling to enter into the transaction 
based on the Diana Group's bare promise alone. But when Josephine Mangiapane, 
president of the Diana Group, acquired Crestar Bank's backing, Appellants proceeded with 
the transaction. 
Sine testified that the letter constituted a primary obligation on the part of Crestar 
Bank as follows: 
24 
Mr. Wikstrom: But before you sent the funds, were you at all concerned 
about where this money was going to go? 
Mr. Sine: The Crestar Bank had said that they would pay us at the end of 
30 banking days the $2.5 million. She (Ms. Mangiapane) obtained 
that letter from them (Crestar Bank) and I figured that she'd simply 
put up assets or funds that were sufficient to cover that. 
Mr. Wikstrom: You really didn't care how she used the money? 
Mr. Sine: The bank was involved, I would suspect that it was legal if the 
bank was involved. I depended upon the bank because I didn't know 
her (Ms. Mangiapane). 
Mr. Wikstrom: You didn't care how she used the money. You were 
looking to the bank? 
Mr. Sine: I was looking to the bank. (Trial Transcript at 150.) 
# # * 
Mr. Sine: The bank in my mind was verifying that she (Ms. Mangiapane) 
was legitimate and they were saying that they (Crestar Bank) would pay the 
funds. What the relationship between her and the bank was, I assumed that 
she was a good client and they were doing this for her. (Trial Transcript at 
153) 
Sine's testimony is reasonable and consistent with legal principles. Sine testified, 
in essence, that the March 24, 1998 letter and the wire transfer that accompanied it 
function as a contract and warranty to transfer $2.5 Million from Crestar Bank to Sine's 
Trust account in Utah. As one court observed, 
A guaranty is a collateral undertaking to answer for the debt, performance, 
or default of another. . . . (Citations omitted.) A warranty, on the other 
hand, is a primary obligation wherein the undertaking is that the subject 
matter of a contract is or will be what it has been represented to be. 
Nicolaysen v. Flato, 204 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The March 24,1998 
letter functions as a warranty because of its express language, "we warrant and certify to 
transfer to you . . . $2,500,000.00. . . . " (Emphasis added.) Crestar's warranty and 
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certification to transfer funds is a primary obligation on Crestar's part that is enforceable 
as a contract. 
B. Cree's and Mangiapane's interpretation. 
Nancy Cree and Josephine Mangiapane offered a different interpretation of the 
letter. In essence they testified that the letter was, at best, an escrow instruction. 
Ironically, Ms. Cree did not testify so much as to what the letter was, as to what it was 
not. She testified as follows: 
Q: Did you have any discussion with Ms. Mangiapane about the lanuage -
a discussion similar to the one that you had about the February 6 
letter? 
A: Well, basically, you know, that this was not a bank guarantee and the 
bank wouldn't be held accountable. So I pretty much, you know, was 
assured that there shouldn't be a problem. 
Q: Did she tell you that this letter was required because of her arrangement 
with Mr. Sine and her escrow account arrangement that she had with 
Mr. Sine? 
A: She may have repeated it. I can't recall the exact conversation. . . . 
(Cree deposition, p. 47 lines 4-17; see Addendum, Exhibit I.) 
Following Ms. Cree, Ms. Mangiapane expressly testified that the letter was an 
escrow instruction as follows: 
Q: Did there come a time when you requested Crestar to write some sort of 
letter? 
A: Yes, I did, as part of what would have been escrow account instructions. 
(Mangiapane depo, p. 59, line 14-60). Mangiapane then testified that the letter, "was 
simply an escrow statement." (Id., page 95, lines 6-13.) 
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This "escrow instruction" interpretation of the letter is not reasonable. The letter 
cannot be an escrow instruction. Escrow instructions are issued by persons or entities to 
the lending institution, not the other way around as is the case here. For the letter to be 
an escrow instruction it would have had to have been an instruction to Crestar from 
Mangiapane telling the bank to not transfer $2.5 million to Sine unless the funds were on 
deposit in Diana Group's account. For Cree and Mangiapane to say that the letter is an 
escrow instruction defies logic, not to mention common business practice. 
Furthermore, the Cree and Mangiapane interpretations are not credible and, in the 
case of Mangiapane, wholly without foundation. Again, Ms. Cree testified as to what the 
letter was not. Mangiapane, who was not even a party or signatory to the letter, testified 
that the letter was an escrow instruction. Judge Young allowed Mangiapane's testimony 
to come in over counsel for Appellants' objection to any such testimony as hearsay. {See 
Trial Transcript, at 176, lines 1 -12.) Thus, the only reasonable, credible interpretation 
of the letter with any foundation is Sine's, i.e., that the letter constitutes a primary 
obligation on the part of Crestar. 
The Judge ignored Sine's testimony and instead adopted the position taken by Mr. 
Fran Wikstrom, counsel for Crestar, who was not a party to the transaction, and who is 
not allowed to testify, that "at most, [the] letter constituted an agreement to transfer when 
and if the funds were available from Diana and nothing more." (Trial Transcript, at 39, 
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lines 21-23.) The Court's acceptance of Mr. Wikstrom's testimony of what the letter 
meant, for which there was no evidence, was clearly erroneous and should be overturned. 
THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL: WAS THE COURT'S RULING THAT MS. CREE 
DID NOT HAVE ANY AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE MARCH 24, 1998 
LETTER ERRONEOUS? 
In addition to finding that the March 24,1998 Letter was ambiguous, Judge Young 
also found Nancy Cree had no actual, implied or apparent authority to issue a guaranty or 
other obligation on behalf of Crestar Bank. Here again, Judge Young is wrong. 
Crestar argued at trial, and Judge Young agreed, that Nancy Cree did not have the 
authority to commit the bank to this transaction. After all, argued Crestar, she was only 
an assistant vice-president. Regardless of her title or position, Nancy Cree was an agent 
of Crestar Bank clothed with apparent authority from the Bank. 
A. An agent with apparent authority can bind its principal. 
It has long been recognized in Utah that a principal can be bound by the acts of an 
agent clothed with apparent authority. The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this 
doctrine in Marcis v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984 (2001), where 
it said, "An agent's knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority is 
imputed to his or her principal, for it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed 
to the principal. (Citations omitted.)" \ 21. See also Wood v. Strevell-Paterson Hardware 
Co., 313 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah 1957) ("All such acts and contracts of the agent as are 
within the apparent scope of the authority conferred on him, although no actual authority 
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to do such acts or to make such contracts has been conferred, are also binding upon the 
principal."). 
Agents with apparent authority can bind their employer corporations by executing 
guaranties like the one contained in the March 24, 1998 Letter. In Glyfada Seafaring 
Corp. v. Fillmore Shipping Ltd., 685 F.Supp. 40 (So. Dist. N.Y. 1987), the United Stated 
District Court for the Southern District of New York said, "We hold that when [defendant] 
executed the guarantee of April 6, he was in fact authorized to do so. We further hold 
that, even if he were not actually authorized, [defendant] had the apparent authority to 
execute the guarantee on which apparent authority plaintiff reasonably relied." Glyfada 
at 43.2 Thus, if Cree had apparent authority, she had the power to bind Crestar Bank. 
B. Cree was an agent of the bank clothed with apparent authority; the bank is 
bound by her actions. 
The evidence at trial showed that Cree was clothed with the indicia of authority. 
The March 24, 1998 Letter was issued on official Crestar letterhead and signed by Cree 
in her capacity as branch manager. Furthermore, Both Sine and Mangiapane testified at 
trial that they thought Cree had the authority to do what she did. Sine testified as follows: 
Mr. Christensen: Did you talk to Ms. Cree? 
2In this case a guarantee and warranty was given to Trustee Sine by the branch 
manager of a bank, who appeared to have the authority to enter into these kinds of 
transactions. Sine was given absolutely no reason to believe that Cree did not have the 
authority to act on behalf of the bank in this transaction. Sine's reliance on Cree's 
apparent authority was thus reasonable. 
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Mr. Sine: I did. 
Mr. Christensen: What did you ask Ms. Cree? 
Mr. Sine: I asked Ms. Cree if she had prepared the letter. 
Mr. Christensen: And what did she say to you? 
Mr. Sine: She said that she had. . . . 
Mr. Christensen: Was there any other discussion between the two of you? 
Mr. Sine: No. I just verified that she was the assistant vice president of the 
bank and she was the branch manager and that she know Geopane. 
Mr. Christensen: Mangiapane? 
Mr. Sine: Mangiapane, that was it. She told me that she had been, that 
Mangiapane had been a long time client of the bank and was held in 
very high respect. (Transcript, pp. 55-56.) 
Furthermore, Ms. Mangiapane testified, "Cree was the authority at the bank." 
(Mangiapane deposition, page 34, lines 19-21; see Addendum, Exhibit J.) She also 
testified, "Cree was one of the better employees at Crestar" (Id., page 36, lines 1-4) and 
that, "It was obvious that every time you had to cash a check, Cree would have to okay 
it, so why go through a surreptitious route when you could deal with her?" (Id., page 35, 
lines 8-11.) 
Finally, Cree herself testified that in addition to managing employees, meeting sales 
goals, performing customer service and handling new accounts, her responsibilities 
included insuring that the bank followed procedures. (Cree deposition p. 18, line 19 
through p. 19 line 13; see Addendum, Exhibit I.) It is clear from the evidence that Cree 
was clothed with apparent authority to issue the March 24, 1998 Letter. 
C. Crestar knew about the March 24, 1998 Letter within days of its issuance. 
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Aside from the parties' perceptions of Cree's authority, it is important to note that 
Crestar Bank knew about Cree's dealings with Mangiapane and knew within days that Cree 
issued the March 24,1998 Letter. Cree testified that her supervisor, Nancy Wilson, knew 
about the March 24, 1998 Letter and that Ms. Wilson was also aware that Ms. Cree had 
sent an identical letter on the same day to a company called Unisource on behalf of Ms. 
Mangiapane, which Crestar rescinded a few days later. (Cree deposition, pages 109 -110; 
see Addendum, Exhibit I.) Ms. Cree further testified that: 1) she had been terminated from 
the bank; 2) that a termination meeting was held by Nancy Cree's supervisors and Cree; 
and 3) that the only reason given for Cree's termination was that she should have been 
more careful in her transactions (plural) with Mangiapane. {Id., pages 109 - 110.) 
In spite of Ms. Cree's testimony, Judge Young held that just because the bank was 
aware of Cree and Mangiapane's Unisource transaction it did not follow that the bank was 
aware of Cree and Mangiapane's transaction with Sine. After all, said Judge Young, a 
corporation can't be charged with the knowledge of all its agents.3 
3Mr. Christensen and Judge Young engaged in the following exchange at trial. 
The Court: I don't have any evidence that they (Nancy Cree's superiors) knew that the 
transaction with Sine existed. 
Mr. Christensen: The bank knew that. 
The Court: No, they didn't. I don't have -
Mr. Christensen: Isn't Nancy Cree the bank? 
The Court: Nancy Cree knew that. 
Mr. Christensen: Sure. Nancy Cree and that's the bank. 
The Court: Yeah, but Nancy Cree is not sending out the recission letter that Wilson is 
sending out [for the Unisource transaction]. 
Mr. Christensen: I understand what you're saying but the bank is the bank. I don't 
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With regard to what knowledge a principal can be charged with this Court said, in 
Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1995): 
Basic agency law dictates that a principal is bound by the acts of an agent 
clothed with apparent authority. (Citations omitted.) In Harrison v. Auto 
Securities Co., 70 Utah 11, 257 P. 677 (1927), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is a general principle of the law of agency, running through 
all contracts made by agents with third parties, that the 
principals are bound by the acts of their agents which fall 
within the apparent authority of the agents, and that the 
principals will not be permitted to deny the authority of their 
agents against innocent third parties, who have dealt with those 
agents in good faith. 
The Horrocks court continued, "'Where a loss is to be suffered though the misconduct of 
an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in his power to do the wrong.'" Id. at 16 
citing County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U.S. 272, 279, 24 L.Ed. 889, 890 (1877). So it 
should be in this case. 
Crestar will argue that Cree's knowledge cannot be imputed to Crestar because she 
was acting adversely to Crestar's interests. Again, the Horrocks Court said on this issue: 
Even when the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the 
knowledge of the agent may still be imputed to the principal. The 
Restatement provides: The principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent 
think the bank can hide behind the fact that one of their agents knows something 
another agent might know something different. I think the bank is charged with the 
knowledge in a combined sense of all of its agents. 
The Court: I've got your position but I deny your request to amend. . . . 
(Trial Transcript at 197, lines 4-20.) 
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who acts adversely to the principal: (a) if the failure of the agent to act upon 
or to reveal the information results in a violation of a contractual or 
relational duty of the principal to a person harmed thereby; [or] (b) if the 
agent enters into negotiations within the scope of his powers and the person 
with whom he deals reasonably believes him to be authorized to conduct the 
transaction. . . . Restatement (Second) of Agency § 282 (1958). 
Id., at 17. Ms. Cree clearly failed to inform her superiors ahead of time that she was 
issuing letters like the March 24,1998 Letter or obtain permission from the bank to do so. 
In fact Ms. Cree had been reprimanded by her superiors several months before for making 
misleading representations to third parties about Ms. Mangiapane's financial strength. 
{See R. 1223, footnote 1.) Cree was under an affirmative duty to keep the bank informed 
about all of Mangiapnae's suspicious activities. Cree failed to do so in a timely manner 
and Appellants were harmed thereby in the amount of $2.5 million. 
D. Case law dictates that Crestar must be held liable for Cree's actions. 
As has already been demonstrated, the law is replete with cases that hold principals 
responsible for their agent's actions. Two additional cases have particular bearing on the 
issues at hand. Said the District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 
Even without actual authority to execute [a] letter of credit, apparent 
authority may arise by a principle's action which lacks such ordinary care as 
to clothe an agent with the indicia of authority, thus leading a reasonably 
prudent person to believe that the agent has the authority he purports to 
exercise. (Citations omitted.) 
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Agri Export Cooperative v. Universal Savings Assoc., 767 F.Supp. 824, 830 (S.D. Texas 
1991). 
Furthermore, in Grabowski v. Bank of Boston, 996 F. Supp 111 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
1997), a case that specifically concerns banks and wire transfer transactions, the court said, 
"[W]here . . . a bank can easily ascertain whether an agent is exceeding his authority on 
the face of documents necessary to the transaction, it will be liable for the unauthorized 
transaction." Id., at 127. (Emphasis added.) So it was with Nancy Cree and Crestar 
Bank. Crestar Bank issued the March 24, 1998 Letter, warranting and certifying to 
transfer $2.5 Million to Trustee Sine after 30 banking days. Sine accepted this offer and 
wired $500,000.00 to Diana's account at Crestar, with the instruction that the $2.5 Million 
was to be paid 30 after 30 banking days without protest, setoff or delay. Crestar never 
communicated to Sine that Cree was not in a position to make this kind of commitment on 
behalf of the bank, or that Crestar was not in a position to transfer the $2.5 Million unless 
it was already in Diana's account, neither did Crestar ever object to the wire instruction. 
Thus Crestar obligated itself to transfer $2.5 Million to Trustee Sine 30 days after the 
deposit of the $500,000.00. The trial court erroneously ruled otherwise. 
FOURTH ISSUE ON APPEAL: DID THE COURT CORRECTLY DENY 
APPELLANTS' RULE 15(b) MOTIONS? 
In addition to the foregoing, the Court erroneously denied Appellants' four Rule 
15(b) motions. Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically allows a cause 
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of action to be brought at trial even if that cause of action was not pleaded in the 
complaint. Rule 15(b) says, in relevant part: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment 
. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Appellants put on evidence that showed: (1) Crestar had breached Article 4A of the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"); (2) Crestar violated a letter of credit and thus 
breached Article 5 of the UCC; (3) negligence on the part of Crestar Bank; and (4) breach 
of fiduciary duty on the part of Crestar Bank. The trial court erroneously rejected each 
of Appellants' motions to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
A. Breach of Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code 
In addition to their cause of action for Breach of Contract against Crestar, Plaintiffs 
also have a cause of action against Crestar for Breach of Article 4A of the UCC as codified 
in § 70A-4a-101 et.seq. of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). Article 4A 
governs wire transfers of funds. Though the mechanics of Article 4A are dealt with in 
greater detail in section V, infra, suffice it to say at this point that in certain circumstances, 
Article 4A requires a bank that receives payment instructions with a wire transfer to honor 
those instructions or reject the transfer and refund the sender's money. (See generally 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-4a-103, 70A-4a-201, 70A-4a-204.) In order for Appellants to 
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state a cause of action for breach of Article 4A, Appellants had to put on evidence that: 
1) Trustee Sine wired funds to Crestar Bank with proper instructions; 2) that Crestar 
received the wire and the instructions; and that 3) Crestar did not follow the instructions 
or reject the wire transfer. See id. Appellants put on all of this evidence at trial. 
Sine testified that he wired $500,000.00 to Crestar on March 27, 1998. (Trial 
Transcript, 74 lines 16-19.) This evidence was uncontroverted as was Sine's testimony 
that he sent the following wire instructions with the funds. 
The receipt and acceptance (by Crestar Bank) of this $500,000.00USD wire, 
serves to reconfirm Bra. Mgr. letter dated 24 Mar.98. Said letter warrants 
& certifies Crestar's promise to pay, & transfer $2,500,000USD (via bank 
to bank wire) without protest, set off or delay, within 31 banking days of 
receipt of this wire, to the account of Wesley F. Sine, atty. Trust 
Acct.#12036086, Bank of Utah, to the attn. of Mr. Dave Tayler, Mgr.4 
(Addendum, Exhibits B and D.) The instructions were received and seen by Crestar as 
evidenced by Trial Exhibit D, which is a printout of the instructions Sine sent as printed 
by Crestar's own wire-ops department. Finally, it is clear from the evidence that Crestar 
did not follow the wire instructions, nor did Crestar reject the transfer of $500,000.00 
because it was unable to comply with the instructions. The instructions were simply 
4Sine testified, on cross examination, that he talked to his bank officer, Dave 
Taylor, at the Bank of Utah - a banker of 30 years - who said that Crestar would be 
bound by the Fedwire instructions sent with Appellants' wire of $500,000.00 to 
Crestar. (See Trial Transcript, at 72.) 
36 
ignored. All of this evidence amounts to a cause of action against Crestar for breach of 
Article 4A of the UCC. 
In spite of Appellants' evidence Judge Young denied Appellants' Rule 15(b) motion 
to amend to add a cause of action for breach of Article 4A of the UCC. This alone shows 
that Judge Young clearly stepped beyond his bounds. But what is equally, if not more 
disturbing, was Judge Young's sanction of Crestar's response to Appellants' evidence on 
this issue. 
In response to Appellants' evidence, and prior to the time Appellants made their 
Rule 15(b) motion,5 Crestar proffered testimony, which the judge accepted over 
Appellants' objections, from an unidentified, non-present expert witness, that the bank was 
not obligated to follow the wire instructions. The proffer occurred as follows: 
Mr. Wikstrom: Your Honor, can I tell you my dilemma? 
The Court: Yes. 
Mr. Wikstrom: I've got a potential expert witness to testify about this that 
I don't think I need because as a matter of law, I'm entitled to a 
judgment on that and I need to tell her one way or the other and plan 
accordingly. So, at some point I would like to argue this fully and 
get the Court's ruling because the law is what it is. . . . 
The Court: You're entitled to a motion for a [directed] verdict from that 
respect. 
interestingly, Judge Young granted Crestar's motion to dismiss the wire transfer 
cause of action before the cause of action was even officially presented to the court. 
Crestar made its motion to dismiss when Appellants' rested. Appellants did not move to 
amend to add the wire transfer cause of action pursuant to Rule 15(b) until after Crestar 
rested, at the close of all the evidence. 
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Mr. Christensen: Your Honor, the only problem there is we don't even 
have a cause of action on this point. 
The Court: What I'm saying to you both is, it doesn't mean that you might 
not prevail on the basis of what you've presented. I'm saying to you 
right now, that you're not going to prevail on the basis of the wire 
aspect of it. 
Mr, Christensen: And I understand what your predilection is what you're 
actually ruling now. But again you've asked [us] whether or not I've 
put on evidence and I said yes. The very last document that I put on 
not five minutes ago, makes it clear that the wire transfer that was 
received by the bank has advice instructions on it and the advice 
instructions have everything that I told you that they did and that it 
that [sic] this money was sent to the bank subject to the instructions 
that were included on the advice that was sent by Mr. Sine from Utah 
Bank. . . . 
The Court: I didn't say you hadn't met the burden of showing that they 
received the instructions. I'm saying you haven't met the burden of 
showing that they had an obligation to be aware and attentive to the 
instructions. 
(Trial Transcript, at 170-171.) Not only were Appellants not given the right to cross 
examine Crestar's expert, Appellants were not even allowed to know her identity or what 
bank she worked for. Indeed, Mr. Wikstrom clearly indicated later in his proffer that the 
non-present, unidentified expert would testify that: 
[T]he bank has to pay attention to the details of whose account they put the 
money in, what date they do, but what they don't have to pay attention to are 
the information fields which are called bank to bank info and (inaudible) 
BNF info, that those fields have no impact, legal impact, on wire transfers. 
That's what our wire expert will say is a matter of practice. (Trial 
Transcript, at 172-173.) (Emphasis added.) 
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Mr. Wikstrom made no indication that Crestar's expert would testify with regard to bank 
practices generally, the practices of Crestar bank or the practices at the expert's particular 
bank. 
In the end it did not matter. Judge Young simply ignored the evidence, allowed the 
proffer, granted Crestar's motion to dismiss Appellants' wire transfer cause of action and 
denied Appellants' Rule 15(b) motion to amend. Judge Young's ruling on this point was 
erroneous and should be overturned. 
B. The March 24, 1998 Letter was a letter of credit. 
In addition to Appellants' Rule 15(b) motion to amend to add a cause of action for 
breach of Article 4A, Appellants moved the court to amend their pleadings add a cause of 
action for breach of a letter of credit under Article 5 of the UCC as codified in Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-5-101, et.seq. (Trial Transcript at 194.) This too was erroneously denied by 
Judge Young. 
The March 24,1998 Letter is, if anything, a letter of credit as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-5-102(10). Section 70A-5-102(10) defines "letter of credit" as: 
[A] definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of Section 70A-5-1046 
by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the account of an applicant 
or, in the case of a financial institution, to itself or for its own account, to 
6Section70A-5-104 says, "A letter of credit, confirmation, advice, transfer, 
amendment, or cancellation may be issued in any form that is a record and is 
authenticated: (1) by a signature; or (2) in accordance with the agreement of the parties 
or the standard practice referred to in Subsection 70A-5-108(5)." 
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honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item of 
value. 
The March 24, 1998 Letter meets all of the requirements under § 70A-5-102(10) to be a 
letter of credit. Therefore, Crestar was obligated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-5-
108 (Issuer's rights and Obligations) to honor the March 24, 1998 Letter and pay Trustee 
Sine as Crestar agreed to do. Crestar did not honor the March 24, 1998 Letter and 
therefore violated article 5 of the UCC as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-5-101 et.seq. 
Nevertheless, Judge Young would not allow Appellants to amend its pleadings to conform 
to the evidence of Crestar's violation. 
At this point, it is appropriate to observe that Crestar argued, and Judge Young 
agreed, that the Letter was not supported by consideration and is therefore unenforceable. 
This is wrong for three reasons, the first of which relates to letters of credit. Under 
Article 5 of the UCC no consideration from the beneficiary is required for the issuance of 
the letter of credit.7 This is so because the bank is not looking to the beneficiary (Trustee 
Sine) for repayment, it is looking to its customer (Mangiapane and/or Diana Group). As 
indicated above, Sine testified that he was looking primarily to Crestar to pay according 
to the terms of the Letter, precisely in the manner of a letter of credit. 
7See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-5-105 (Consideration is not required to issue, 
amend, transfer, or cancel a letter of credit, advice, or confirmation.). 
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The second reason Crestar's lack of consideration argument fails is that Cree herself 
testified that the bank did benefit from Appellants' transfer of $500,000. In this regard, 
Cree testified as follows: 
Q: Can you recall the words that Ms. Mangiapane said to you that caused 
you to write that letter? 
A: No, other than the fact that she would be opening an escrow account that 
would be a substantial account for the bank. . . . (Cree deposition, 
page 99, line 20 through Page 100, line 3; see Addendum, Exhibit I.) 
(See also Trial Exhibit 28.) 
Finally, Sine's reasonable reliance on Crestar's representations is a consideration 
substitute. See Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987); see also Stangl v. Ernst 
Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Sine reasonably relied on 
Crestar's representation that it would transfer $2.5 million to his trust account 30 banking 
days after his deposit of $500,000. Thus Judge Young ruled incorrectly that there was no 
consideration for the March 24, 1998 Letter. 
C. Crestar's negligence. 
Along with breach of Article 4A and letter of credit motions, Appellants moved the 
court pursuant to Rule 15(b) to add a cause of action for negligence against Crestar. This 
motion was likewise denied. It is clear from the evidence outlined above that Crestar was 
negligent in that: 1) Crestar had a duty to inform Sine that Cree had made false and 
misleading representations about Mangiapane and/or Diana Group's financial strength and 
stability. This duty arose from Cree's previous misrepresentations to other parties about 
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Mangiapane; 2) Crestar breached that duty by not informing Sine of Cree's 
misrepresentations and by allowing Cree to issue the March 24, 1998 Letter without ever 
rescinding it as it did with regard to the letter issued to Unisource; 3) Crestar's breach of 
its duty to warn Sine of Cree's propensity to misrepresent Mangiapane and/or Diana Group 
and Crestar's failure to rescind the March 24, 1998 Letter caused Appellants to give the 
bank half a million dollars; and 4) Appellants have been damaged because of Crestar's 
breach in the amount of $2.5 million. Judge Young should have therefore granted 
Appellants' Rule 15(b) motion on this issue. 
D. Crestar's breach of fiduciary duty. 
Finally, Appellants' moved to add a cause of action for breach of its fiduciary duty. 
As with the other three Rule 15(b) motions, Judge Young denied this last motion. Crestar 
knew that Nancy Cree and Josephine Mangiapane were up to something. Indeed Cree was 
reprimanded by her superiors for her dealings with Mangiapane many months prior to the 
issuance of the March 24, 1998 Letter. Crestar Bank therefore had a fiduciary duty to 
Appellants to warn them that Cree did not have authority to do what she was doing, that 
Mangiapane was not all that Cree made her out to be, and that the March 24, 1998 Letter 
was unenforceable. Crestar did none of these things and thereby breached its fiduciary 
duty to the Appellants. Judge Young should have granted Appellants' Rule 15(b) motion 
on this issue. 
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FIFTH ISSUE ON APPEAL: DID THE TRIAL COURT RULE CORRECTLY 
ON THE WIRE TRANSFER ISSUE? 
The final issue in this appeal revolves again around the wire transfer of $500,000.00 
and the "advice instructions" that accompanied that transfer. As noted above, Judge 
Young dismissed Appellants' wire transfer cause of action. In so doing, Judge Young 
misapplied the law that governs wire transfers. 
A. Governing Law: Article 4A v. Regulation J 
Generally speaking, the wire transfer of funds is governed by Article 4A of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and its corresponding provisions in §70A-4a-101 et. seq. of 
the Utah Code Annotated (the "Utah Uniform Commercial Code"). Section 70A-4a-102 
provides that Utah's version of Article 4A applies to "funds transfers" which are not 
governed by The Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (which applies specifically to 
consumer transactions and, hence, does not apply here). (See § 70A-4a-102; see also § 
70A-a-108.) 
Article 4A of the UCC is not the only body of law that governs the wire transfer of 
funds. For example, the Bank of Utah, the bank which issued the wire transfer and the 
instruction to Crestar, uses a system for wire transfers called "Fedwire," which is the 
Federal Reserve Banks' wire-transfer system. Consequently, the wire transfer is 
technically governed by Regulation J as codified as 12 C.F.R. § 210.25 et.seq. (See also 
Grossman v. Nationsbank, 225 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. Ct. App. 2000) ("The district 
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court held . . . that the provisions of Regulation J exclusively apply to the fund transfer 
in this case because it was effected by the use of Fedwire. . . . " (Citations omitted.)). 
Nevertheless, Regulation J "incorporates the provisions of Article 4A [of the UCC]." 12 
C.F.R. § 210.25(b)(1). To the extent Regulation J and Article 4A are inconsistent, 
Regulation J governs. Id. The relevant provisions of Article 4A as they appear in § 70 A-
4a-101 et.seq. of the Utah Code and as they appear in Regulation J are identical. 
Therefore, for convenience, we refer to the wire transfer at issue as being governed by 
Article 4A of the UCC.8 
B. Funds Transfers and Payment Orders 
In order to fall within the provisions of Article 4A, a wire transfer must constitute 
a "payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the 
order." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4a-104. A "payment order" is "an instruction of a sender 
(Trustee Sine) to a receiving bank (Crestar), transmitted orally, electronically, or in 
writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money 
to a beneficiary (Trustee Sine) . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4a-
8Some of the documents at issue indicate that Trustee Sine intended to send a 
S.W.I.F.T. wire to Crestar. (See Trial Exhibit 20.) Although technically a different 
wiring system with its own set of rules, S.W.I.F.T. wire transfers also generally fall 
under Article 4A of the UCC. See Piedmont Resolution, L.L.C. v. Johnston, Rivlin & 
Foley, L.L.P. 999 F. Supp 34 at 47 (D.C. 1998). However, Crestar conceded in its 
trial memorandum that it would have some liability to Sine if the wire were sent by the 
S.W.I.F.T. system. (R. 1231, footnote 3.) 
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103(3). Furthermore, in order to be enforceable, the instruction must not "state a 
condition to payment to the beneficiary other than time of payment. . . . " Id. Finally, 
Article 4A dictates that, in order to be an enforceable payment order, "the receiving bank 
is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise receiving payment from, the 
sender; and . . . the instruction [must be] transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving 
bank or to an agent, funds transfer system, or communication system for transmittal to the 
receiving bank." Id. 
C. Crestar's Obligations with regard to the Wire Transfer 
In this case, Crestar received a wire transfer of $500,000.00 from Plaintiffs on 
March 27, 1998 together with an accompanying instruction, which was an integral part of 
the wire transfer. That instruction said: 
The receipt and acceptance (by Crestar Bank) of this $500,000 USD wire, 
serves to reconfirm Bra. Mgr. Letter dated 24 Mar.98 Said letter warrants 
and certifies Crestar's promise to pay & Transfer $2,500,000 USD (via bank 
to bank wire) without protest, set off or delay, within 31 banking days of 
receipt of this wire, to the account of Wesley F. Sine xxx.. .xxx 
This wire transfer of $500,000.00 constitutes a "payment order" in that it directs 
Crestar to deposit the funds into Diana Group's account. In this case the payment order 
was sent with an instruction to return $2.5 Million within 31 banking days. Under these 
circumstances, Crestar had two options when it received the wire transfer and the 
accompanying instruction under the UCC: 1) Crestar was obliged to give notice to Sine 
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that the payment order had been rejected, or 2) Crestar was obliged to follow the 
instructions. Crestar did neither. 
Section 70A-4a-210 specifically obligates a receiving bank (Crestar) to reject a 
payment order if the payment order cannot be fulfilled. (See § 70A-4a-210(l), (2) ("This 
subsection applies if a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank fails to execute a 
payment order despite the existence on the execution date of a withdrawable credit balance. 
. . .").)9 Crestar did not object to these instructions in any way or inform Plaintiffs that 
Crestar had no intent of following these instructions as required under §70A-4a-210 of 
Utah's UCC. 
In addition to the provisions cited above, § 70A-4a-204(a) of Utah's UCC says, 
If a receiving bank accepts a payment order issued in the name of its 
customer as sender which is not authorized and not effective as the order of 
the customer under Section 70A-4a-202, or not enforceable, in whole or in 
part, against the customer under Section 70A-4a-203, the bank shall refund 
any payment of the payment order received from the customer to the extent 
the bank is not entitled to enforce payment and shall pay interest on the 
refundable amount calculated from the date the bank received payment to the 
date of the refund. (Emphasis added.) 
The key word in § 70A-4a-204 is "customer." As defined in § 70A-4a-105(1), a 
"customer", for the purposes of Article 4A, is "a person . . . with an account with the 
bank (Mangiapane in this case) or from whom the bank has agreed to receive payment 
9As explained below, the ultimate "beneficiary" of the wire was supposed to 
have been Trustee Sine. Thus the beneficiary's bank is Sine's bank, the Bank of Utah, 
not Crestar. 
46 
orders (Sine)." (Emphasis added.) By issuing the March 24,1998 Letter, Crestar agreed 
to receive Sine's payment order, i.e., Sine's wire transfer of funds with its accompanying 
instruction to repay $2.5 million in 30 banking days. Thus Sine, along with Mangiapane, 
is a "customer" of Crestar and Crestar must either follow the payment order or reject and 
refund the payment to Trustee Sine. Crestar did not follow Trustee Sine's instructions. 
Neither did Crestar reject the payment order or refund the $500,000.00. 
Crestar's failure to follow the instructions constitutes a breach of § 70A-4a-204 of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Crestar argued at trial, and Appellants do not 
disagree, that the purpose of Article 4A is to better facilitate the wire transfer of funds. (R. 
1232.) However Article 4A does not operate to negate basic contract law. The moment 
Crestar received the wired funds with the instructions, Crestar had two choices under 
§70A-4a-204: 1) reject the wire and refund the $500,000.00; or 2) accept the wired funds 
subject to the instructions. Crestar accepted the funds. In so doing Crestar waived its 
right to refund Appellants' money and became obligated to pay Appellants $2.5 million 
after 30 banking days. Appellants were damaged in the amount of $2,500,000.00 as a 
result of Crestar's failure to object to or follow the wire instructions. Crestar is therefore 
liable to Plaintiffs for that amount plus interest, costs, and additional consequential 
damages because of Crestar's prior agreement to transfer the $2.5 Million to Trustee Sine 
{See the March 24, 1998 Letter). Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4a-305(3)(4). 
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Crestar will argue that the wire instructions Sine sent contain unacceptable 
conditions that preclude them from being enforceable under Article 4A. Again, Article 
4A states that an instruction that accompanies a payment order is enforceable only if it 
"does not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary other than time of payment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4a-103(3)(a). According to this standard the instructions Sine sent 
with the wire are not improper. It is clear from the March 24, 1998 Letter and again from 
the wire instructions that the ultimate destination of the funds Sine wired was not Diana 
Group's account - it was Trustee Sine's account at the Bank of Utah. Thus, though 
Mangiapane was the initial beneficiary of the wire transfer, she was not the ultimate 
beneficiary. The ultimate beneficiary was Trustee Sine. As the ultimate beneficiary, Sine 
instructed Crestar to wire $2.5 million to his trust account at the Bank of Utah "within 31 
banking days of receipt of this wire." The instruction contains no conditions other than 
time of payment. Thus the wire instructions fall within the protection of Article 4A and 
are enforceable against Crestar.10 
However, even if the wire instructions were impermissible, under § 70A-4a-402, 
Crestar was obligated to refund Appellants' money. It is worth noting that Article 4A 
10According to official comment 3 to section 4A-104 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, an example of an impermissible wire conditions contemplated by section 4a-
103(3)(a) is if the instruction authorizes payment to the beneficiary by the bank only if 
the beneficiary presents appropriate shipping documents to the bank to prove shipment 
of the goods paid for by the wired funds. Sine's instructions contain no such condition. 
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allows for certain instructions to be sent with a wire transfers, i.e., time of payment. 
Banks must look at least for that instruction with every wire transfer that comes in. It 
follows that in searching for the one permissible instruction Crestar would have seen any 
impermissible instructions and should have then either rejected the wire transfer anyway, 
especially one that obligated the bank to pay $2.5 million to Trustee Sine. Crestar will 
argue that the wire instructions were unintelligible at the time they were received by the 
bank and were therefore not binding on the bank in any case. (R. 1299, f 33.) The same 
logic that applies to instructions generally also applies here. If Crestar could not 
understand the instructions, they should have refused the wire and refunded the money. 
Instead Crestar accepted the funds and the instruction and allowed Mangiapane to draw 
against the funds to her heart's content. 
D. Case law supports Appellants. 
To this point, the wire transfer has been analyzed through strict statutory 
construction. This is primarily because Article 4A has only been in existence for about 
ten years. In Utah, for example, there are no cases on point. However, there are cases 
from other jurisdictions that are instructive. 
Piedmont Resolution, L.L.C. v. Johnston, Rivlin & Foley, L.L.P. 999 F. Supp 34 
(D.C. 1998), is a wire transfer case that concerns a deal that sounded too good to be true. 
In Piedmont, the sender of the wire transfer sent two pages of instructions with a 
S. W. I. F. T. wire transfer. The Piedmont court ultimately concluded that because the wire 
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at issue was sent over the S.W.I.F.T. system, and because it contained a conditions other 
than the time of payment it fell outside the protection of Article 4A. See id. However, 
the Piedmont court recognized that if the transfer had fallen under Article 4A, the bank 
would have incurred "an obligation to the beneficiary . . . upon acceptance of the funds." 
Id., at 36. Interestingly, the Piedmont court took pains to cite the testimony of one of the 
defendant's expert who testified that "virtually all funds transfers are unconditional and 
banks will almost always refuse to send or execute a conditional funds transfer because of 
the added cost, difficulty, and unknown liability attendant upon it." Id. It stands to reason 
under Piedmont that if Crestar felt Sine's wire contained unacceptable conditions it should 
have refused the wire and refunded the $500,000.00. 
In Grabowski v. Bank of Boston, 997 F.Supp. I l l (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1997), the 
Massachusetts District Court unequivocally set forth the first fundamental principle that 
governs the relationship between banks and their depositors with regard to wire transfers. 
Said the Grablowski court, "[A] bank has a duty to follow all of its depositors' instructions 
after accepting a deposit." Grabowski., at 128. (Emphasis added.) The Grabowski court 
found that die Bank of Boston was liable under Article 4A for allowing an attorney to 
make wire transfers that were contrary to the powers of attorney on hand at the bank that 
controlled the transferor's actions. While it is true that the Grabowski court stated that 
inappropriate instructions "are anathema to [wire transfers governed by] article 4A," there 
were no improper instructions sent to Crestar with Sine's wired funds. Id., at 121. 
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Furthermore, as observed above, Sine was a "customer" of Crestar for purposes of Article 
4A. I Index Grabowski and the provisions of Article 4A, Crestar should therefore have 
f< »lli : » \ ved the instructs >ns IK1 win \ iillli tin 'hOU.ililli I in. 
In hghi ( ilic forepomi1, Judiv Vtmw (Tinncnu^l' dismissed Appellants' wire 
transfer cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
Trustee Sine had an agreement w ith Crestai Ban] L " I hat agreement w as that the 
tun! UH minted In pay $2 S Million iiiiinlui I nislir Sine's rsnn\s JI< ivtunt iifUT 'SO h;inls in»• 
days in exchange for a deposit of $500,000.00. i.^stcc Sine performed under the 
agreement wVr -lie bank did in- Tlu hank had an affirmative obligation under Article 
**.\ K,\ U t t .1, .-wwiiiKiv.a, i out tv tinier icjLx. »**. . •;. iransier and return the 
I- - i -• •* •* The Iifinil; mho 
had an affirmative obligation to warn Sine of Cree's prior dealings with Mangiapane or to 
rescind the March 24, 1998 Letter altogether. The bank did none of these things. 
Appellants acknowledge mat the inai court awaiu, .* i':amiij i> a .\ inini^h judgment 
against llir IMM.IIIII in (inmp I 111.ml ||iidi'iiit/iil IS iimolliTlililr nil is nnl win III 11 IL1 pupri nil m 
printed on. Even Judge Young acknowledged that granting the judgment was, in essence, 
cold comfort for Plaintiffs.11 In the end whatever Appellants' arrangements were with 
1
 .During closing argument counsel for Appellants and the Court engaged in the 
following exchange: 
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Mangiapane and Diana Group do not matter. Crestar obligated itself to perform under the 
March 24, 1998 Letter and the wire transfer instructions and then refused to perform. 
Banks should be held to a higher standard. They handle and often control people's 
life-blood: money. When a bank like Crestar issues a letter that induces a third party to 
give up half a million dollars, that bank should be held accountable. When a bank like 
Crestar accepts a wire transfer will an accompanying instruction that is neither followed 
nor refused, that bank should be held accountable. For these reasons and for all of the 
preceding reasons, this Court should overturn Judge Young's rulings. 
DATED thisfe day of September. 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
The Court: No, I don't have any trouble protecting your client. Your client has 
a $3 million judgment. I've already issued it. 
Mr. Christensen: That's right, and we both know what that's worth. 
The Court: I don't know what it's worth but I have suspicions. 
Mr. Christensen: As do I. (Trial Transcript at 211.) 
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March 24, 1998 Transaction Code: UNI/SAL3M98; 
Unisource Cap LLC 
4400 Mac Arthur Blvd., #500 
Newport Beach, CA 92660 
Attn: Ms. Zahra Ghods 
Dear Sir: 
On behalf of our Client, Diana Group, Inc., we warrant and certify lo transfer to you, 
directly, on a bank-to-bank basis, lo your designated account, the sum of $2,000,000.00. 
Said transfer will be no later than 15 banking days from the dale after the deposit of 
51,000,000.00, to Escrow Account Number 206849540, Account Holder - 10321. 
Sincerely, ••
 N 
. - # < • - - • , / • ' • 
NaniyY. Crce ' 
Assistant Vice President 
and Branch Manager 
Georgetown Office 
2929 M Street, N.W. 






March 30, 1998 
Unisource Cap LLC 
4400 MacArthur Blvd., #500 
Newport Beach, CA 92660 
Attn: Ms. Zahra Ghods 
Dear Sir: 
This letter is sent on behalf of Crestar Bank to rescind our letter dated March 24, 199S (Please 
see attached copy of referenced letter). 
Per our internal guidelines, we are not in a position to make this commitment until we actuaJly 
have the funds on deposit and written instructions from our customer. 
We regret any inconvenience this may have caused you. The undersigned may be contacted at 
202 879-6542. 
Sincerely, 
infancy L. Willson 
Vice President 
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P A R T I 
SUBJECT MATTER AND DEFINITIONS 
70A-4a-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as Uniform Commercial Code — Funds Transfers 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-101, enac ted by District of Columbia have adopted UCC Article 
L. 1990, c h 294, *> 4. 4A Funds Transfers 
Uniform Laws — Forty nine states and the 
70A-4a-102. Subject matter. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-4a 108, this chapter applies to 
funds transfers defined in Section 70A-4a-104 
History: C 1953, 70A-4a 102, enacted by 
L 1990, ch 294, <> 5 
70A-4a-103. Payment order — Definitions. 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank 
(2) "Beneficiary's bank" means the bank identified in a payment order in 
which an account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order or 
which otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary if the order does not 
provide for payment to an account 
(3) "Payment order" means an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank 
transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank 
to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary if 
(a) the instruction does not state a condition to payment to the 
beneficiary other than time of payment, 
(b) the receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or 
otherwise receiving payment from, the sender, and 
(c) the instruction is transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving 
bank or to an agent, funds transfer system, or communication system foi 
transmittal to the receiving bank 
(4) "Receiving bank" means the bank to which the sender's instruction is 
addressed 
(5) "Sender" means the person giving the instruction to the receiving bank 
(6) If an instruction complying with Subsection (3) is to make more than one 
payment to a beneficiary, the instruction is a separate payment order with 
respect to each of the payments 
(7) A payment order is issued when it is sent to the receiving bank 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-103, enac ted by subsections into cJphatx tic il ordtr md in 
L. 1990, ch . 294, ^ 6; 1993, ch 237, <J 133 serted complying with Subsection ( *)" in Sub 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1993 amend section (6) 
ment effective July 1 1993, redesignated the 
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fOA-4a-104, Funds transfer — Definitions, 
(1) "Funds transfer" means the series of transactions, beginning with the 
•riginator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the 
•eneficiary of the order. The term includes any payment order issued by the 
riginator's bank or an intermediary bank intended to carry out the origina-
v>r's payment order. A funds transfer is completed by acceptance by the 
eneficiary's bank of a payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary of the 
riginator's payment order. 
(2) "Intermediary bank" means a receiving bank other than the originator's 
ank or the beneficiary's bank. 
(3) "Originator" means the sender of the first payment order in a funds 
-ansfer. 
(4) "Originator's bank" means: 
(a) the receiving bank to which the payment order of the originator is 
issued if the originator is not a bank; or 
(b) the originator if the originator is a bank. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 70A-4a-104, e n a c t e d by ment, effective July 1, 1993, redesignated the 
. 1990, c h . 294, ^ 7; 1993, c h . 237, § 134. subsections into alphabetical order and made 
A m e n d m e n t No te s . — The 1993 amend- stylistic changes throughout the section. 
0A-4a-105. Other definitions. 
(1) In this chapter: 
(a) "Authorized account" means a deposit account of a customer in a 
bank designated by the customer as a source of payment orders issued by 
the customer to the bank. If a customer does not so designate an account, 
any account of the customer is an authorized account if payment of a 
payment order from that account is not inconsistent with a restriction on 
the use of that account. 
(b) "Bank" means a person engaged in the business of banking, and 
includes a savings hank, savings and loan association, credit union, and 
trust company. A branch or separate office of a bank is a separate bank for 
purposes of this chapter. 
(c) "Customer" means a person, including a bank, having an account 
with a bank or from whom a bank has agreed to receive payment orders. 
(d) "Funds transfer business day" of a receiving bank means the part of 
a day during which the receiving bank is open for the receipt, processing, 
and transmittal of payment orders and cancellations and amendments of 
payment orders. 
(e) "Funds transfer system" means a wire transfer network, automated 
clearing house, or other communication system of a clearing house or other 
association of banks through which a payment order by a bank may be 
transmitted to the bank to which the order is addressed. 
(f) "Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing. 
(g) "Prove" with respect to a fact means to meet the burden of estab-
lishing the fact under Subsection 70A-1-20K8). 
(2) Other definitions applying to this chapter and the sections in which they 
ppear are: 
(a) "Acceptance," Section 70A-4a-209; 
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(b) "Beneficiary," Section 70A-4a-103; 
(c) "Beneficiary's bank," Section 70A-4a-103; 
(d) "Executed," Section 70A-4a-301; 
(e) ' Execution date," Section 70A-4a-301; 
(f) "Funds transfer system rule," Section 70A-4a-501; 
(g) "Funds transfer," Section 70A-4a-104; 
(h) "Intermediary bank," Section 70A-4a-104; 
(i) "Originator," Section 70A-4a-104; 
(j) "Originator's bank," Section 70A-4a-104; 
(k) "Payment by beneficiary's bank to beneficiary," Section 70A-4a-405; 
(1) "Payment by originator to beneficiary," Section 70A-4a-406; 
(m) "Payment by sender, to receiving bank," Section 70A-4a-403; 
(n) "Payment date," Section 70A-4a-401; 
(o) "Payment order," Section 70A-4a-103; 
(p) "Receiving bank," Section 70A-4a-103; 
(q) "Security procedure," Section 70A-4a-201; and 
(r) "Sender," Section 70A-4a-103. 
(3) The following definitions in Chapter 4 apply to this chapter: 
(a) "Clearinghouse," Section 70A-4-104; 
(b) "Item," Section 70A-4-104; and 
(c) "Suspends payments," Section 70A-4 104. 
(4) In addition, Title 70A, Chapter 1, Uniform Commercial Code — General 
Provisions, contains general definitions and principles of construction and 
interpretation applicable throughout this chapter. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 70A-4a-105, e n a c t e d by ment, effective July 1, 1993, made stylistic 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 8; 1993, ch . 237, $ 135. changes in Subsections (1Kb) and (4). 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1993 amend-
70A-4a-106. Time payment order is received. 
(1) The time of receipt of a payment order or communication canceling or 
amending a payment order is determined by the rules applicable to receipt of 
a notice stated in Subsection 70A-1-20K27). A receiving bank may fix a cutoff 
time or times on a funds transfer business day, as a cutoff time for the receipt 
and processing of payment orders and communications canceling or amending 
payment orders. Different cutoff times may apply to receipt of payment orders, 
cancellations, or amendments, or to different categories of payment orders, 
cancellations, or amendments. A cutoff time may apply to senders generally or 
different cutoff times may apply to different senders or categories of payment 
orders. If a payment order or communication canceling or amending a payment 
order is received after the close of a funds transfer business day or after the 
appropriate cutoff time on a funds transfer business day, the receiving bank 
may treat the payment order or communication as received at the opening of 
the next funds transfer business day. 
(2) If this chapter refers to an execution date or payment date or states a day 
on which a receiving bank is required to take any action, and the date or day 
does not fall on a funds transfer business day, the next day that is a funds 
transfer business day is treated as the date or day stated, unless the contrary 
is stated in this chapter. 
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History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-106, e n a c t e d by merit, effective July 1, 1993, inserted "cutoff" in 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 9; 1993, ch . 237, § 136. the second sentence of Subsection (1) and made 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1993 amend- stylistic changes. 
70A-4a-107. f edera l reserve regulations and operating 
circulars. 
Regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
operating circulars of the Federal Reserve Banks supersede any inconsistent 
provision of this chapter to the extent of the inconsistency. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-107, e n a c t e d by Reserve Banks, see Title 21 U.S.C. and the 
L. 1990, ch. 294, § 10. regulations authorized and promulgated pur-
Federal Law. — For provisions relating to suant thereto, 
the Federal Reserve System and to Federal 
70A-4a-108. Exclusion of consumer transactions gov-
erned by federal law. 
This chapter does not apply to a funds transfer any part of which is governed 
by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, Title XX, Public Law 95-630, 92 
Stat. 3728, 15 U.S.C. Section 1693 et seq., as amended. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-108, e n a c t e d by 
L. 1990, ch. 294, § 11. 
PART 2 
ISSUANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENT ORDER 
70A-4a-201. Security procedure. 
(1) "Security procedure" means a procedure established by agreement of a 
customer and a receiving bank for the purpose of: 
(a) verifying that a payment order or communication amending or 
canceling a payment order is tha t of the customer; or 
(b) detecting error in the transmission or the content of the payment 
order or communication. 
(2) A security procedure may require the use of algorithms or other codes, 
identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback procedures, or similar 
security devices. Comparison of a signature on a payment order or communi-
cation with an authorized specimen signature of the customer is not by itself 
a security procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-201, e n a c t e d by 
L. 1990, ch. 294, § 12. 
70A-4a-202. Authorized and verified payment orders, 
(1) A payment order received by the receiving bank is the authorized order 
of the person identified as sender if that person authorized the order or is 
otherwise bound by it under the law of agency. 
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(2) (a) If a bank and its customer have agreed that the authenticity of 
payment orders issued to the bank in the name of the customer as sender 
will be verified pursuant to a security procedure, a payment order received 
by the receiving bank is effective as the order of the customer, whether or 
not authorized, if: 
(i) the security procedure is a commercially reasonable method of 
providing security against unauthorized payment orders; and 
(ii) the bank proves that it accepted the payment order in good faith 
and in , compliance with the security procedure and any written 
agreement or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of 
payment orders issued in the name of the customer. 
(b) The bank is not required to follow an instruction that violates a 
written agreement with the customer or notice of which is not received at 
a time and in a manner affording the bank a reasonable opportunity to act 
on it before the payment order is accepted. 
(3) Commercial reasonableness of a security procedure is a question of law 
to be determined by considering the wishes of the customer expressed to the 
bank, the circumstances of the customer known to the bank, including the size, 
type, and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the 
bank, alternative security procedures offered to the customer, and security 
procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated. 
A security procedure is considered to be commercially reasonable if: 
(a) the security procedure was chosen by the customer after the bank 
offered, and the customer refused, a security procedure that was commer-
cially reasonable for that customer; and 
(b) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any 
payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name, and 
accepted by the bank in compliance with the security procedure chosen by 
the customer. 
(4) The term "sender" in this chapter includes the customer in whose name 
a payment order is issued if the order is the authorized order of the customer 
under Subsection (1), or it is effective as the order of the customer under 
Subsection (2). 
(5) This section applies to amendments and cancellations of payment orders 
to the same extent it applies to payment orders. 
(6) Except as provided in this section and in Subsection 70A-4a-203(2), 
rights and obligations arising under this section or Section 70A-4a-203 may 
not be varied by agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-202, enac ted by 
L. 1990, c h . 294, § 13. 
70A-4a-203. Unenforceability of certain verified payment 
orders, 
(1) This section applies to an accepted payment order that, pursuant to 
Subsection 70A-4a-202(l), is not an authorized order of a customer identified 
as sender, but which is effective as the order of the customer pursuant to 
Subsection 70A-4a-202(2). 
(2) By express written agreement, the receiving bank may limit the extent 
to which it is entitled to enforce or retain payment of the payment order. 
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70A-4a-206. Transmission of payment order through 
funds transfer or other communication system. 
If a payment order addressed to a receiving bank is transmitted to a funds 
transfer system or other third-party communication system for transmittal to 
the bank, the system is deemed to be an agent of the sender for the purpose of 
transmitting the payment order to the bank. If there is a discrepancy between 
the terms of the payment order transmitted to the system and the terms of the 
payment order transmitted by the system to the bank, the terms of the 
payment order of the sender are those transmitted by the system. This section 
applies to amendments and cancellations of payment orders to the same extent 
it applies to payment orders. This section does not apply to a funds transfer 
system of the Federal Reserve Banks. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-206, e n a c t e d by 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 17. 
70A-4a-207. Misdescription of beneficiary. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if, in a payment order received by the 
beneficiary's bank, the name, bank account number, or other identification of 
the beneficiary refers to a nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account, no 
person has rights as a beneficiary of the order and acceptance of the order 
cannot occur. 
(2) If a payment order received by the beneficiary's bank identifies the 
beneficiary both by name and by an identifying or bank account number and 
the name and number identify different persons then the following rules apply. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), the beneficiary's bank 
may treat the person identified by number as the beneficiary of the order if the 
bank does not know tha t the name and number refer to different persons, it 
may rely on the number as the proper identification of the beneficiary of the 
order. The beneficiary's bank need not determine whether the name and 
number refer to the same person. 
(4) If the beneficiary's bank pays the person identified by name or knows 
that the name and number identify different persons, no person has rights as 
beneficiary except the person paid by the beneficiary's bank if that person was 
entitled to receive payment from the originator of the funds transfer. If no 
person has rights as beneficiary, acceptance of the order cannot occur. 
(5) If the conditions listed in Subsections (5Xa), (b), and (c) are present, the 
rules listed in Subsections (6) and (7) apply: 
(a) a payment order described in Subsection (2) is accepted; 
(b) the originator's payment order described the beneficiary inconsis-
tently by name and number; and 
(c) the beneficiary's bank pays the person identified by number as 
permitted by Subsection (2)(a). 
(6) If the originator is a bank, the originator is obliged to pay its order. 
(7) If the originator is not a bank and proves that the person identified by 
number was not entitled to receive payment from the originator, the originator 
is not obliged to pay its order unless the originator's bank proves that the 
originator, before acceptance of the originator's order, had notice that payment 
of a payment order issued by the originator might be made by the beneficiary's 
bank on the basis of an identifying or bank account number even if it identifies 
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a person different from the named beneficiary. Proof of notice may be made by 
any admissible evidence. The originator's bank satisfies the burden of proof it 
if proves that the originator, before the payment order was accepted, signed a 
writing stating the information to which the notice relates. 
(8) In a case governed by Subsection (2)(a), if the beneficiary's bank 
rightfully pays the person identified by number and that person was not 
entitled to receive payment from the originator, the amount paid may be 
recovered from that person to the extent allowed by the law governing mistake 
and rescission as follows: 
(a) If the originator is obliged to pay its payment order as stated in 
Subsection (5), the originator has the right to recover. 
(b) If the originator is not a bank and is not obliged to pay its payment 
order, the originator's bank has the right to recover. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-207, enacted by for "If the beneficiary's bank pays the person 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 18; 1993, ch. 237, § 139. identified by number, it lias no duty to" in the 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1993 amend- last sentence of Subsection (3), deleted former 
ment, effective July 1, 1993, redesignated Subsections (3) and (4) relating to the origina-
former Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb) as Subsec- tor's obligation upon inconsistent name and 
tions (3) and (4), substituted "Subsection (5)" number description and a right to recover r e -
fer "Subsection (3)" and added the language titution, added Subsections (5) through (8), and 
beginning "it may rely" in the first sentence and made stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and 
substi tuted "The beneficiary's bank need not" (4). 
70A-4a-208. Misdescription of intermediary bank or ben-
eficiary's bank. 
(1) This subsection applies to a payment order identifying an intermediary 
bank or beneficiary's bank by an identifying number. 
(a) The receiving bank may rely on the number as the proper identifi-
cation of the intermediary or beneficiary's bank and need not determine 
whether the number identifies a bank. 
(b) The sender is obliged to compensate the receiving bank for any loss 
and expenses incurred by the receiving bank as a result of its reliance on 
the number in executing or attempting to execute the order. 
(2) This subsection applies to a payment order identifying an intermediary 
bank or beneficiary's bank both by name and an identifying number if the 
name and number identify different persons. 
(a) If the sender is a bank, the receiving bank may rely on the number 
as the proper identification of the intermediary or beneficiary's bank if the 
receiving bank, when it executes the sender's order, does not know that the 
name and number identify different persons. The receiving bank need not 
determine whether the name and number refer to the same person oi 
whether the number refers to a bank. The sender is obliged to compensate 
the receiving bank for any loss and expenses incurred by the receiving 
bank as a result of its reliance on the number in executing or attempting 
to execute the order. 
(b) If the sender is not a bank and the receiving bank proves that the 
sender, before the payment order was accepted, had notice that the 
receiving bank might rely on the number as the proper identification of the 
intermediary or beneficiary's bank even if it identifies a person different 
from the bank identified by name, the rights and obligations of the sender 
and the receiving bank are governed by Subsection (2)(a), as though the 
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PART 3 
EXECUTION OF SENDER'S PAYMENT ORDER BY 
RECEIVING BANX 
70A-4a-30L "Execution" and "execution date/' 
(1) A payment order is "executed" by the receiving bank when it issues a 
>ayment order intended to carry out the payment order received by the bank. 
V payment order received by the beneficiary's bank can be accepted but cannot 
>e executed. 
(2) "Execution date" of a payment order means the day on which the 
eceiving bank may properly issue a payment order in execution of the sender's 
>rder. The execution date can be determined by instruction of the sender but 
annot be earlier than the day the order is received and, unless otherwise 
ietermined, is the day the order is received. If the sender's instruction states 
i payment date, the execution date is the payment date or an earlier date on 
vhich execution is reasonably necessary to allow payment to the beneficiary on 
he payment date. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 70A-4a-301, e n a c t e d b y 
,. 1990, c h . 294, fc 24. 
r0A-4a-302. Obligations of receiving bank in execution of 
payment order. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (4), if the receiving bank 
ccepts a payment order pursuant to Subsection 70A-4a-209(l), the bank has 
he following obligations in executing the order: 
(a) The receiving bank is obliged to issue, on the execution date, a 
payment order complying with the sender's order and to follow the 
sender's instructions concerning any intermediary bank or funds transfer 
system to be used in carrying out the funds transfer, or the means by 
which payment orders are to be transmitted in the funds transfer. If the 
originator's bank issues a payment order to an intermediary bank, the 
originator's bank is obliged to instruct the intermediary bank according to 
the instruction of the originator. An intermediary bank in the funds 
transfer is similarly bound by an instruction given to it by the sender of 
the payment order it accepts. 
(b) If the sender's instruction states that the funds transfer is to be 
carried out telephonically or by wire transfer or otherwise indicates that 
the funds transfer is to be carried out by the most expeditious means, the 
receiving bank is obliged to transmit its payment order by the most 
expeditious available means, and to instruct any intermediary bank 
accordingly. If a sender's instruction states a payment date, the receiving 
bank is obliged to transmit its payment order at a time and by means 
reasonably necessary to allow payment to the beneficiary on the payment 
date or as soon thereafter as is feasible. 
(2) (a) Unless otherwise instructed, a receiving bank executing a payment 
order may: 
(i) use any funds transfer system if use of that system is reasonable 
in the circumstances; and 
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(ii) issue a payment order to the beneficiary's bank or to an 
intermediary bank through which a payment order conforming to the 
sender's order can expeditiously be issued to the beneficiary's bank if 
the receiving bank exercises ordinary care in the selection of the 
intermediary bank. 
(b) A receiving bank is not required to follow an instruction of the 
sender designating a funds transfer system to be used in carrying out the 
funds transfer if the receiving bank, in good faith, determines that it is not 
feasible to follow the instruction or that following the instruction would 
unduly delay completion of the funds transfer. 
(3) Unless Subsection (l)(b) applies or the receiving bank is otherwise 
instructed, the bank may execute a payment order by transmitting its 
payment order by first class mail or by any means that are reasonable in the 
circumstances. If the receiving bank is instructed to execute the sender's order 
by transmitting its payment order by a particular means, the receiving bank 
may issue its payment order by the means stated or by any means as 
expeditious as the means stated if the means used are reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
(4) Unless instructed by the sender: 
(a) the receiving bank may not obtain payment of its charges fur 
services and expenses in connection with the execution of the sender's 
order by issuing a payment order in an amount equal to the amount of the 
sender's order less the amount of the charges; and 
(b) may not instruct a subsequent receiving bank to obtain payment of 
its charges in the same manner. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 70A-4a-302, e n a c t e d by bubject to Subsections (2) through (4)," added 
L. 1990, c h . 294, fc 25; 1993, ch . 237, S 145; the proviso at the beginning of Subsection (1 . 
1994, ch . 12, § 106. and made stylistic changes in Subsection (1 )(a» 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1993 amend- The 1994 amendment , effective May 2, 1994. 
ment, effective July 1, 1993, deleted the former corrected references in Subsection (1). 
first sentence, which read "This subsection is 
70A-4a-303. Erroneous execut ion of payment order. 
(1) A receiving bank that executes the payment order of the sender b\ 
issuing a payment order in an amount greater than the amount of the sender's 
order, or issues a payment order in execution of the sender's order and then 
issues a duplicate order, is entitled to payment of the amount of the sender's 
order in accordance with Subsection 70A-4a-402(3) if that subsection is 
otherwise satisfied. The bank is entitled to recover from the beneficiary of the 
erroneous order the excess payment received to the extent allowed by the law 
governing mistake and restitution. 
(2) (a) A receiving bank that executes the payment order of the sender by 
issuing a payment order in an amount less than the amount of the sender's 
order is entitled to payment of the amount of the sender's order in 
accordance with Subsection 70A-4a-402(3) if: 
(i) that subsection is otherwise satisfied; and 
(ii) the bank corrects its mistake by issuing an additional payment 
order for the benefit of the beneficiary of the sender's order. 
(b) If the error is not corrected, the issuer of the erroneous order is 
entitled to receive or retain payment from the sender of the order it 
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sender to pay the bank the amount of the sender's order Payment by the 
sender is not due until the execution date of the sender's order The obligation 
of that sender to pay its payment order is excused if the funds transfer is not 
completed by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a payment order instruct-
ing payment to the beneficiary of the sender's payment order 
(4) If the sender of a payment order pays the order and was not obliged to 
pay all or part of the amount paid, the bank receiving payment is obliged to 
refund payment to the extent the sender was not obliged to pay Except as 
provided in Sections 70A-4a-204 and 70A-4a-304, interest is payable on the 
refundable amount from the date of payment 
(5) If a funds transfer is not completed as stated in Subsection (3) and an 
intermediary bank is obliged to refund payment as stated in Subsection (4), but 
is unable to do so because not permitted by applicable law or because the bank 
suspends payments, a sender in the funds transfer that executed a payment 
order in compliance with an instruction, as stated in Subsection 70A-4a-
302(l)(a), to route the funds transfer through that intermediary bank is 
entitled to receive or retain payment from the sender of the payment order that 
it accepted The first sender in the funds transfer that issued an instruction 
requiring routing through tha t intermediary bank is subrogated to the right of 
the bank that paid the intermediary bank to refund as stated in Subsection (4) 
(6) The right of the sender of a payment order to be excused from the 
obligation to pay the order as stated in Subsection (3) or to receive refund 
under Subsection (4) may not be varied by agreement 
History C 1953, 70A-4a-402, e n a c t e d by ment effective July 1 1993 made stylistic 
L 1990, ch 294, § 30, 1993, ch 237, <* 150 changes throughout the section 
A m e n d m e n t Notes — The 1993 amend 
70A-4a-403. Payment by sender to receiving bank. 
(1) Payment of the sender's obligation under Section 70A 4a 402 to pay the 
receiving bank occurs as follows 
(a) If the sender is a bank, payment occurs when the receiving bank 
receives final settlement of the obligation through a Federal Reserve Bank 
or through a funds transfer system 
(b) If the sender is a bank and the sender 
(I) credited an account of the receiving bank with the sender, or 
(n) caused an account of the receiving bank in another bank to be 
credited, payment occurs when the credit is withdrawn or, if not 
withdrawn, at midnight of the day on which the credit is withdraw-
able and the receiving bank learns of that fact 
(c) If the receiving bank debits an account of the sender with the 
receiving bank, payment occurs when the debit is made to the extent the 
debit is covered by a withdrawable credit balance in the account 
(2) If the sender and receiving bank are members of a funds transfer system 
that nets obligations multilaterally among participants, the receiving bank 
receives final settlement when settlement is complete in accordance with the 
rules of the system The obligation of the sender to pay the amount of a 
payment order transmitted through the funds transfer system may be satis-
fied, to the extent permitted by the rules of the system, by setting off and 
applying against the sender's obligation the right of the sender to receive 
payment from the receiving bank of the amount of any other payment order 
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t ransmitted to the sender by the receiving bank through the funds transfer 
system The aggregate balance of obligations owed by each sender to each 
receiving b ink in the funds transfer system may be satisfied, to the extent 
permitted by the rules of the system, by setting off and applying against that 
balance the aggregate balance of obligations owed to the sender by other 
members of the system The aggregate balance is determined after the right of 
setoff stated in the second sentence of this subsection has been exercised 
(3) If two banks transmit payment orders to each other under an agreement 
tha t settlement of the obligations of each bank to the other under Section 
70A-4a-402 will be made at the end of the day or other period, the total amount 
owed with respect to all orders transmitted by one bank shall be set oft against 
the total amount owed with respect to all orders transmitted by the other bank 
To the extent of the setoff each bank has made payment to the other 
(4) In any case not covered by Subsection (1), the time when payment of the 
sender's obligation under Subsection 70A 4a 402(2) or (3) occurs is governed by 
applicable principles of law that determine when an obligation is satisfied 
History C 1953, 70A 4a 403, enacted by 
L. 1990, c h 294, * 31 
70A-4a-404. Obligation of beneficiary's bank to pay and 
give notice to beneficiary. 
(1) Subject to Subsection 70A 4 i 211(5) and Subsections 70A 4a 405(4) and 
(5), if a beneficiary's bank accepts a paymc nt oidcr the bank is obliged to p IV 
the amount of the order to the beneficiary of the oidt r F lyment is due on the 
payment date of the oider, but if acceptance occurs on the payment date afU i 
the close of the funds transfer business day of the bank payment is due on the 
next funds transfer business day If the bank refuses to pay after demand bv 
the beneficiary and receipt of notice of particular circumstances that will give 
rise to consequential damages as a result of nonpayment, the beneficiary may 
recover damages resulting from the refusal to pay to the extent the bank had 
notice of the damages, unless the bank proves that it did not pay because of a 
reasonable doubt concerning the right of the beneficiary to payment 
(2) If a payment order accepted by the beneficiary's bank instructs payment 
to an account of the beneficiary, the bank is obliged to give notice to the 
beneficiary of receipt of the order before midnight of the next funds transfer 
business day following the payment date If the payment order does not 
instruct payment to an account of the beneficiary, the bank is required to notify 
the beneficiary only if notice is required by the order Notice may be given by 
first class mail or any other means reasonable in the circumstances If the 
bank fails to give the required notice as required by this subsection the bank 
is obliged to pay interest to the beneficiary on the amount of the payment order 
from the day notice should have been given until the day the beneficiary 
learned of receipt of the payment order by the bank No other damages a u 
recoverable Reasonable attorneys' fees are also recoverable if demand for 
interest is made and refused before an action is brought on the claim 
(3) The right of a beneficiary to receive payment and damages as stated in 
Subsection (1) may not be varied by agreement or a funds transfer system ruk 
The right of a beneficiary to be notified as stated in Subsection (2) may be 
varied by agreement of the beneficiary or by a funds transfer system rule if the 
beneficiary is given notice of the rule before initiation of the funds transfei 
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70A-4a-405 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL, <JVU& 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-404, e n a c t e d by ment, effective July 1, 1993, made stylistic 
L. 1990, ch. 294, § 32; 1993, ch . 237, § 151. changes throughout the section. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1993 amend-
70A-4a-405. Payment by beneficiary's bank to beneficiary. 
(1) If a beneficiary's bank credits an account of the beneficiary of a payment 
order, payment of the bank's obligation under Subsection 70A-4a-404(l) occurs 
when and to the extent: 
(a) the beneficiary is notified of the right to withdraw the credit; 
(b) the bank lawfully applies the credit to a debt of the beneficiary; or 
(c) funds with respect to the order are otherwise made available to the 
beneficiary by the bank. 
(2) If the beneficiary's bank does not credit an account of the beneficiary of 
a payment order, the time when payment of the bank's obligation under 
Subsection 70A-4a-404(l) is governed by applicable principles of law that 
determine when an obligation is satisfied. 
(3) Except as stated in Subsections (4) and (5), if the beneficiary's bank pays 
the beneficiary of a payment order under a condition to payment or agreement 
of the beneficiary giving the bank the right to recover payment from the 
beneficiary if the bank does not receive payment of the order, the condition to 
payment or agreement is not enforceable. 
(4) (a) A funds transfer system rule may provide that payments made to 
beneficiaries of funds transfers made through the system are provisional 
until receipt of payment by the beneficiary's bank of the payment order it 
accepted. A beneficiary's bank that makes a payment that is provisional 
under the rule is entitled to refund from the beneficiary if: 
(i) the rule requires tha t both the beneficiary and the originator be 
given notice of the provisional nature of the payment before the funds 
transfer is initiated; 
(ii) the beneficiary, the beneficiary's bank, and the originator's bank 
agreed to be bound by the rule; and 
(iii) the beneficiary's bank did not receive payment of the payment 
order that it accepted. 
(b) If the beneficiary is obliged to refund payment to the beneficiary's 
bank, acceptance of the payment order by the beneficiary's bank is 
nullified and no payment by the originator of the funds transfer to the 
beneficiary occurs under Section 70A-4a-406. 
(5) (a) This subsection applies to a funds transfer that includes a payment 
order transmitted over a funds transfer system that: 
(i) nets obligations multilaterally among participants; and 
(ii) has in effect a loss-sharing agreement among participants for 
the purpose of providing funds necessary to complete settlement of the 
obligations of one or more participants that do not meet their 
settlement obligations, 
(b) If the beneficiary's bank in the funds transfer accepts a payment 
order and the system fails to complete settlement pursuant to its rules 
with respect to any payment order in the funds transfer: 
(i) the acceptance by the beneficiary's bank is nullified and no 
person has any right or obligation based on the acceptance; 
(ii) the beneficiary's bank is entitled to recover payment from the 
beneficiary; 
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(iii) no payment by the originator to the beneficiary occurs under 
Section 70A-4a-406; and 
(iv) subject to Subsection 70A-4a-402(5), each sender in the funds 
transfer is excused from its obligation to pay its payment order under 
Subsection 70A-4a-402(3) because the funds transfer has not been 
completed. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-405, e n a c t e d by ment, effective Ju ly 1, 1993, inserted "the ur„r 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 33; 1993, ch. 237, § 152. when" in Subsection (2) and madf s ty ! - : . : 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1993 amend- changes in Subsections <l)(a), (3>. and (5» h 
70A-4a-406. Payment by originator to beneficiary — Dis-
charge of underlying obligation. 
(1) Subject to Subsection 70A-4a-211(5) and Subsections 70A-4a-405<4> ar.d 
(5), the originator of a funds transfer pays the beneficiary of the o r ig ina l re-
payment order: 
(a) at the time a payment order for the benefit of the benefkian -
accepted by the beneficiary's bank in the funds transfer; and 
(b) in an amount equal to the amount of the order accepted by :r.r 
beneficiary's bank, but not more than the amount of the originator's ord^r 
(2) (a) If payment under Subsection (1) is made to satisfy an obligation. :hc 
obligation is discharged to the same extent discharge would result fr z\ 
payment to the beneficiary of the same amount in money, unless: 
(i) the payment under Subsection (1) was made by a mu: .? 
prohibited by the contract of the beneficiary with respect to :r.c 
obligation; 
(ii) the beneficiary, within a reasonable time after receiving nov.Cc 
of receipt of the order by the beneficiary's bank, notified the origins:-r 
of the beneficiary's refusal of the payment; 
(iii) funds with respect to the order were not withdrawn by :r_c 
beneficiary or applied to a debt of the beneficiary; and 
(iv) the beneficiary would suffer a loss that could reasonably h^vc 
been avoided if payment had been made by a means complying w.;r. 
the contract. 
(b) If payment by the originator does not result in discharge under :r..s 
section, the originator is subrogated to the rights of the benericiary : • 
receive payment from the beneficiary's bank under Subsection 70A-4a-
404(1). 
(3) For the purpose of determining whether discharge of an ublig&:..r. 
occurs under Subsection (2), if the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment on-.r 
in an amount equal to the amount of the originator's payment urder .^> 
charges of one or more receiving banks in the funds transfer, payment tc :r.c 
beneficiary is deemed to be in the amount of the originator's order unless up. r. 
demand by the beneficiary the originator does not pay the benefkian :r.c 
amount of the deducted charges. 
(4) Rights of the originator or of the beneficiary of a funds t r a n - k r ur.it r 
this section may be varied only by agreement of the originator and :r.e 
beneficiary. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-406, e n a c t e d by ment, effective July 1. 1993, m a i > * M > . . - : 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 34; 1993, ch . 237, § 13. change near the end of Subsectior. 2 b • 




70A-4a-501. Variation by agreement and effect of funds 
transfer system rule. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, rights and obligations of a 
party to a funds transfer may be varied by agreement of the affected party. 
(2) (a) "Funds transfer system rule" means a rule of an association of banks: 
(i) governing transmission of payment orders by means of a funds 
transfer system of the association or rights and obligations with 
respect to those orders; or 
(ii) to the extent the rule governs rights and obligations between 
banks that are parties to a funds transfer in which a Federal Reserve 
Bank, acting as an intermediary bank, sends a payment order to the 
beneficiary's bank. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a funds transfer 
system rule governing rights and obligations between participating banks 
using the system may be effective even if the rule conflicts with this 
chapter and indirectly affects another party to the funds transfer who does 
not consent to the rule. A funds transfer system rule may also govern 
rights and obligations of parties other than participating banks using the 
system to the extent stated in Subsection 70A-4a-404(3), Subsection 
70A-4a-405(4), and Subsection 70A-4a-507(3). 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 70A-4a-501, e n a c t e d by ment, effective July 1, 1993, made stylistic 
L. 1990, ch . 294, * 35; 1993, c h . 237, § 154. changes throughout the section. 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1993 amend-
70A-4a-502. Creditor process served on receiving bank — 
Setoff by beneficiary's bank. 
(1) As used in this section, "creditor process" means levy, attachment, 
garnishment, notice of lien, sequestration, or similar process issued by or on 
behalf of a creditor or other claimant with respect to an account. 
(2) This subsection applies to creditor process with respect to an authorized 
account of the sender of a payment order if the creditor process is served on the 
receiving bank. For the purpose of determining rights with respect to the 
creditor process, if the receiving bank accepts the payment order the balance 
in the authorized account is deemed to be reduced by the amount of the 
payment order to the extent the bank did not otherwise receive payment of the 
order, unless the creditor process is served at a time and in a manner affording 
the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it before the bank accepts the 
payment order. 
(3) If a beneficiary's bank has received a payment order for payment to the 
beneficiary's account in the bank the rules listed in Subsections (4) through (6) 
apply. 
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(4) The bank may credit the beneficiary's account and the amount credited 
may be set off against an obligation owed by the beneficiary to the bank or may 
be applied to satisfy creditor process served on the bank with respec t to the 
account. 
(5) The bank may credit the beneficiary's account and may allow withdrawal 
of the amount credited unless creditor process with respect to the account is 
served at a time and in a manner affording the bank a reasonable opportunity 
to act to prevent withdrawal. 
(6) If creditor process with respect to the account has been served and the 
bank has had a reasonable opportunity to act on it, the bank may not reject the 
payment order except for a reason unrelated to the service of process. 
(7) Creditor process with respect to a payment by the originator to the 
beneficiary pursuant to a funds transfer may be served only on the beneficia-
ry's bank with respect to the debt owed by that bank to the beneficiary. Any 
other bank served with the creditor process is not obliged to act with respect to 
the process. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 70A-4a-502, e n a c t e d by deleted "This subsection applies" at the begin 
L. 1990, ch. 294, § 36; 1993, ch . 237, § 155. rung and added "the rules listed in Subsections 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1993 amend- (4) through (6) apply" at the end of Subsection 
ment, effective July 1, 1993, substituted "to" for (3), and redesignated former Subsections (3Ha). 
"if" after "applies," and inserted "if the creditor l3)(b), (3)(c), and (4) as Subsections (4) thiough 
process" in the first sentence of Subsection (2), (7). 
70A-4a-503. Injunction or restraining order with respect 
to funds transfer. 
(1) For proper cause and in compliance with applicable law, a court may 
restrain: 
(a) a person from issuing a payment order to initiate a funds transfer; 
(b) an originator's bank from executing the payment order of the 
originator; or 
(c) the beneficiary's bank from releasing funds to the beneficiary or the 
beneficiary from withdrawing the funds. 
(2) A court may not otherwise restrain a person from issuing a payment 
order, paying or receiving payment of a payment order, or otherwise acting 
with respect to a funds transfer. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-503, e n a c t e d by 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 37. 
70A-4a-504. Order in which items and payment orders 
may be charged to an account — Order of with-
drawals from an account. 
(1) If a receiving bank has received more than one payment order of the 
sender or one or more payment orders and other items that are payable from 
the sender's account, the bank may charge the sender's account with respect to 
the various orders and items in any sequence. 
(2) In determining whether a credit to an account has been withdrawn by 
the holder of the account or applied to a debt of the holder of the account, 
credits first made to the account are first withdrawn or applied. 
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History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-504, e n a c t e d by 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 38. 
70A-4a-505. Preclusion of objection to debit of customer's 
account. 
If a receiving bank has received payment from its customer with respect to 
a payment order issued in the name of the customer as sender and accepted by 
the bank, and the customer received notification reasonably identifying the 
order, the customer is precluded from asserting that the bank is not entitled to 
retain the payment unless the customer notifies the bank of the customer's 
objection to the payment within one year after the notification was received by 
the customer. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 70A-4a-505, e n a c t e d by 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 39. 
70A-4a-506. Rate of interest. 
(1) If, under this chapter, a receiving bank is obliged to pay interest with 
respect to a payment order issued to the bank, the amount payable may be 
determined: 
(a) by agreement of the sender and receiving bank; or 
(b) if the payment order is transmitted through a funds transfer 
system, by a funds transfer system rule. 
(2) If the amount of interest is not determined by an agreement or rule as 
stated in Subsection (1), the amount is calculated by multiplying the applicable 
Federal Funds rate by the amount on which interest is payable, and then 
multiplying the product by the number of days for which interest is payable. 
The applicable Federal Funds rate is the average of the Federal Funds rates 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for each of the days for 
which interest is payable divided by 360. The Federal Funds rate for any day 
on which a published rate is not available is the same as the published rate for 
the next preceding day for which there is a published rate. If a receiving bank 
that accepted a payment order is required to refund payment to the sender of 
the order because the funds transfer was not completed, but the failure to 
complete was not due to any fault by the bank, the interest payable is reduced 
by a percentage equal to the reserve requirement on deposits of the receiving 
bank. 
History: C 1953, 70A-4a-506, e n a c t e d by ment, effective July 1,1993, substituted "under 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 40; 1993, ch . 237, § 156. this chapter" for "pursuant to this chapter" 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1993 amend- near the beginning of Subsection (1). 
70A-4a-507. Choice of law. 
(1) The following rules apply unless the affected parties otherwise agree or 
Subsection (3) applies: 
(a) The rights and obligations between the sender of a payment order 
and the receiving bank are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the receiving bank is located. 
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(b) The rights and obligations between the beneficiary's bank and the 
beneficiary are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
beneficiary's bank is located. 
(c) The issue of when payment is made pursuant to a funds transfer by 
the originator to the beneficiary is governed by the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the beneficiary's bank is located. 
(2) If the parties described in Subsections (l)(a), (b), and (c) have made an 
agreement selecting the law of a particular jurisdiction to govern rights and 
obligations between each other, the law of that jurisdiction governs those 
rights and obligations, whether or not the payment order or the funds transfer 
bears a reasonable relation to that jurisdiction. 
(3) (a) A funds transfer system rule may select the law of a particular 
jurisdiction to govern: 
(i) rights and obligations between participating banks with respect 
to payment orders transmitted or processed through the system; or 
(ii) the rights and obligations of some or all parties to a funds 
transfer, any part of which is carried out by means of the system, 
(b) A choice of law made pursuant to Subsection (a)(i) is binding on 
participating banks. A choice of law made pursuant to Subsection (a)(ii) is 
binding on the originator, other sender, or a receiving bank having notice 
that the funds transfer system might be used in the funds transfer and of 
the choice of law by the system when the originator, other sender, or 
receiving bank issued or accepted a payment order. The beneficiary of a 
funds transfer is bound by the choice of law if, at the time the funds 
transfer is initiated, the beneficiary has notice that the funds transfer 
system might be used in the funds transfer and of the choice of law by the 
system. The law of a jurisdiction selected pursuant to this subsection may 
govern whether or not that law bears a reasonable relation to the matter 
in issue. 
(4) In the event of inconsistency between an agreement under Subsection (2 > 
and a choice of law rule under Subsection (3), the agreement under Subsection 
(2) prevails. 
(5) If a funds transfer is made by use of more than one funds transfer system 
and there is inconsistency between choice of law rules of the systems, the 
matter in issue is governed by the law of the selected jurisdiction that has the 
most significant relationship to the matter in issue. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-4a-507, e n a c t e d by Subsections (l)<a), (b), and (c)" for "in each oi 
L. 1990, ch . 294, § 41; 1993, ch . 237, § 157. the subparagraphs of Subsection < 1)" near the 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1993 amend- beginning of Subsection (2) and "that lias" for 
ment, effective Ju ly 1, 1993, substituted "in "which has" near the end of Subsection <5h 
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payment or acceptance, at the time of presentment, and a previous transferor 
of the draft, a t the t ime of transfer, warrant to the drawee tha t pays or accepts 
the draft in good faith that : 
(a) the warrantor is, or was, a t the time the warrantor transferred the 
draft, a person entitled to enforce the draft or authorized to obtain 
payment or acceptance of the draft on behalf of a person entitled to enforce 
the draft; 
(b) the draft has not been altered; 
(c) the warrantor has no knowledge tha t the signature of the purported 
drawer of the draft is unauthorized; and 
(d) if the draft is a demand draft, creation of the demand draft according 
to the terms on its face was authorized by the person identified as drawer. 
(2) A drawee making payment may recover from a warrantor damages for 
breach of warranty equal to the amount paid by the drawee less the amount 
the drawee received or is entitled to receive from the drawer because of the 
payment. In addition, the drawee is entitled to compensation for expenses and 
loss of interest resulting from the breach. The right of the drawee to recover 
damages under this subsection is not affected by any failure of the drawee to 
exercise ordinary care in making payment. If the drawee accepts the draft: 
(a) breach of warranty is a defense to the obligation of the acceptor; and 
(b) if the acceptor makes payment with respect to the draft, the acceptor 
is entitled to recover from a warrantor for breach of warranty the amounts 
stated in this subsection. 
(3) If a drawee asserts a claim for breach of warranty under Subsection (1) 
based on an unauthorized indorsement of the draft or an alteration of the draft, 
the warrantor may defend by proving tha t the indorsement is effective under 
Section 70A-3-404 or 70A-3-405, or the drawer is precluded under Section 
70A-3-406 or 70A-4-406 from asserting against the drawee the unauthorized 
indorsement or alteration. 
(4) If a dishonored draft is presented for payment to the drawer or an 
indorser, or any other item is presented for payment to a party obliged to pay 
the item, and the item is paid, the person obtaining payment and a prior 
transferor of the item warrant to the person making payment in good faith tha t 
the warrantor is, or was, a t the time the warrantor transferred the item, a 
person entitled to enforce the item or authorized to obtain payment on behalf 
of a person entitled to enforce the item. The person making payment may 
recover from any warrantor for breach of warranty an amount equal to the 
amount paid plus expenses and loss of interest resulting from the breach. 
(5) The warrant ies stated in Subsections (1) and (4) cannot be disclaimed 
with respect to checks. Unless notice of a claim for breach of warranty is given 
to the warrantor within 30 days after the claimant has reason to know of the 
breach and the identity of the warrantor, the warrantor is discharged to the 
extent of any loss caused by the delay in giving notice of the claim. 
(6) A cause of action for breach of warranty under this section accrues when 
the claimant has reason to know of the breach. 
(7) A demand draft is a check, as provided in Section 70A-3-104. 
(8) If the warranty in Subsection (l)(d) is not given by a transferor under 
applicable conflict of law rules, the warranty is not given to that transferor 
when tha t transferor is a transferee. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953,70A-4-208, e n a c t e d b y L. ment, effective Ju ly 1, 1998, added Subsection 
1993, c h . 237, § 111; 1998, c h . 60, § 6. (lXd), mak ing a related change, and added 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amend- Subsections (7) and (8). 
70A-4-210. Security interest of collecting bank in items, 
accompanying documents, and proceeds. 
(1) A collecting bank has a security interest in an item and any accompa-
nying documents or the proceeds of either: 
(a) in case of an item deposited in an account, to the extent to which 
credit given for the item has been withdrawn or applied; 
(b) in case of an item for which it has given credit available for 
withdrawal as of right, to the extent of the credit given, whether or not the 
credit is drawn upon or there is a right of charge-back; or 
(c) if it makes an advance on or against the item. 
(2) If credit given for several items received at one time or pursuant to a 
single agreement is withdrawn or applied in part, the security interest 
remains upon all the items, any accompanying documents or the proceeds of 
either. For the purpose of this section, credits first given are first withdrawn. 
(3) Receipt by a collecting bank of a final settlement for an item is a 
realization on its security interest in the item, accompanying documents, and 
proceeds. So long as the bank does not receive final settlement for the item or 
give up possession of the item or accompanying documents for purposes other 
than collection, the security interest continues to that extent and is subject to 
Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions, 
but: 
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest 
enforceable, Subsection 70A-9a-203(2)(c)(i); 
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and 
(c) the security interest has priority over conflicting perfected security 
interests in the item, accompanying documents, or proceeds. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 70A-4-210, e n a c t e d b y L. ment, effective July 1, 2001, updated the refer-
1993, c h . 237, § 113; 2000, c h . 252, § 28 . ences in Subsection (3). 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2000 amend-
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This chapter shall be known as "Uniform Commercial Code — Letters of 
Credit." 
History: C. 1953,70A-5-101, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5-101, 
1997, ch. 241, § 3. setting out the chapter title, and enacts the 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws present section, effective July 1, 1997. 
1997, ch 241, § 3 repeals former § 70A-5-101, 
70A-5-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adviser" means a person who, at the request of the issuer, a 
confirmer, or another adviser, notifies or requests another adviser to notify 
the beneficiary that a letter of credit has been issued, confirmed, or 
amended. 
(2) "Applicant" means a person a t whose request or for whose account a 
letter of credit is issued. The term includes a person who requests an 
issuer to issue a letter of credit on behalf of another if the person making 
the request undertakes an obligation to reimburse the issuer. 
(3) "Beneficiary" means a person who under the terms of a letter of 
credit is entitled to have its complying presentation honored. The term 
includes a person to whom drawing rights have been transferred under a 
transferable letter of credit. 
(4) "Confirmer" means a nominated person who undertakes, at the 
request or with the consent of the issuer, to honor a presentation under a 
letter of credit issued by another. 
(5) "Dishonor" of a letter of credit means failure timely to honor or to 
take an interim action, such as acceptance of a draft, tha t may be required 
by the letter of credit. 
(6) "Document" means a draft or other demand, document of title, 
investment security, certificate, invoice, or other record, s tatement, or 
representation of fact, law, right, or opinion: 
(a) which is presented in a written or other medium permitted by 
the letter of credit or, unless prohibited by the letter of credit, by the 
s tandard practice referred to in Subsection 70A-5-108(5); and 
(b) which is capable of being examined for compliance with the 
te rms and conditions of the letter of credit. A document may not be 
oral. 
(7) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned. 
(8) "Honor" of a letter of credit means performance of the issuer's 
undertaking in the letter of credit to pay or deliver an item of value. 
Unless the letter of credit otherwise provides, "honor" occurs: 
(a) upon payment; 
(b) if the letter of credit provides for acceptance, upon acceptance of 
a draft and, at maturity, its payment; or 
(c) if the letter of credit provides for incurring a deferred obligation, 
upon incurring the obligation and, a t maturity, its performance. 
(9) "Issuer" means a bank or other person tha t issues a letter of credit, 
bu t does not include an individual who makes an engagement for personal, 
family, or household purposes. 
(10) "Letter of credit" means a definite undertaking tha t satisfies the 
requirements of Section 70A-5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary a t the 
request or for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financia 
institution, to itself or for its own account, to, honor a documentar 
presentation by payment or delivery of an item of value. 
(11) "Nominated person" means a person whom the issuer: 
(a) designates or authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise 
give value under a letter of credit; and 
(b) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse 
(12) "Presentation" means delivery of a document to an issuer o 
nominated person for honor or giving of value under a letter of credit. 
(13) "Presenter" means a person making a presentation as or on behal 
of a beneficiary or nominated person. 
(14) "Record" means information tha t is inscribed on a tangible me 
dium, or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievabl 
in perceivable form. 
(15) "Successor of a beneficiary" means a person who succeeds t 
substantially all of the rights of a beneficiary by operation of law, mciudin, 
a corporation with or into which the beneficiary has been merged o 
consolidated, an administrator, executor, personal representative, t ruste 
in bankruptcy, debtor in possession, liquidator, and receiver. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-102, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5 10: 
1997, ch. 241, § 4. establishing the scope of the chapter, and er 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws acts the present section, effective July 1, 199' 
1997, ch 241, § 4 repeals former § 70A-5-102, 
70A-5 103. Scope. 
(1) This chapter applies to letters of credit and to certain rights am 
obligations arising out of transactions involving letters of credit. 
(2) The statement of a rule in this chapter does not by itself require, imph 
or negate application of the same or a different rule to a situation not provide* 
for, or to a person not specified, in this chapter. 
(3) With the exception of this Subsection (3), Subsections (1) and (4 
Subsections 70A-5-102(9) and (10), 70A-5-106(4), and 70A-5-114(4), and excep 
to the extent prohibited in Subsections 70A-1-102(3) and 70A-5-117(4), th 
effect of this chapter may be varied by agreement or by a provision stated o 
incorporated by reference in an undertaking. A term in an agreement o 
undertaking generally excusing liability or generally limiting remedies fo 
failure to perform obligations is not sufficient to vary obligations prescribed b 
this chapter. 
(4) Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or a nominate* 
person under a letter of credit are independent of the existence, performance 
or nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of which the letter o 
credit arises or which underlies it, including contracts or arrangement 
between the issuer and the applicant and between the applicant and th< 
beneficiary. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-103, enacted by L. as last amended by Laws 1996, ch 204, ^ ." 
1997, ch. 241, § 5. defining terms and cross-referencing other dcf 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws nit ions, and enacts the present section, effec 
1997, ch. 241, § 4 repeals former § 70A-5-103, tive July 1, 1997 
70A-5-104. Formal requirements. 
A letter of credit, confirmation, advice, transfer, amendment, or cancellation 
may be issued in any form tha t is a record and is authenticated: 
(1) by a signature; or 
(2) in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the s tandard 
practice referred to in Subsection 70A-5-108(5). 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-104, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 164, § 5-104, 
1997, ch. 241, *5 6. pertaining to formal requirements, and enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws the present section, effective July 1, 1997 
1997, ch. 241, § 6 repeals former § 70A-5-104, 
70A-5-105. Consideration, 
Consideration is not required to issue, amend, transfer, or cancel a letter of 
credit, advice, or confirmation. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-105, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5-105, 
1997, ch. 241, § 7. relating to consideration, and enacts the 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws present section, effective July 1, 1997 
1997, ch 241, § 7 repeals former § 70A-5-105, 
70A-5-106. Issuance, amendment, cancel lation, and dura-
t ion. 
(1) A letter of credit is issued and becomes enforceable according to its terms 
against the issuer when the issuer sends or otherwise t ransmits it to the 
person requested to advise or to the beneficiary. A letter of credit is revocable 
only if it so provides. 
(2) After a letter of credit is issued, rights and obligations of a beneficiary, 
applicant, confirmer, and issuer are not affected by an amendment or cancel-
lation to which tha t person has not consented except to the extent the letter of 
credit provides tha t it is revocable or that the issuer may amend or cancel the 
letter of credit without that consent. 
(3) If there is no stated expiration date or other provision that determines 
its duration, a letter of credit expires one year after its stated date of issuance 
or, if none is stated, after the date on which it is issued. 
(4) A letter of credit tha t states that it is perpetual expires five years after 
its stated date of issuance, or if none is stated, after the date on which it is 
issued. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-106, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 5-106, 
1997, ch. 241, {§ 8. relating to time and effect of establishing 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws credit, and enacts the present section, effective 
1997, ch. 241, § 8 repeals former § 70A-5-106, July 1, 1997. 
70A-5-107. Confirmer, nominated person, and adviser. 
(1) A confirmer is directly obligated on a letter of credit and has the rights 
and obligations of an issuer to the extent of its confirmation. The confirmer also 
has rights against and obligations to the issuer as if the issuer were an 
applicant and the confirmer had issued the letter of credit a t the request and 
for the account of the issuer. 
(2) A nominated person who is not a confirmer is not obligated to honor or 
otherwise give value for a presentation. 
(3) A person requested to advise may decline to act as an adviser. An adviser 
that is not a confirmer is not obligated to honor or give value for a presentation. 
An adviser undertakes to the issuer and to the beneficiary accurately to advise 
the terms of the letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice received 
by tha t person and undertakes to the beneficiary to check the apparent 
authenticity of the request to advise. Even if the advice is inaccurate, the letter 
of credit, confirmation, or amendment is enforceable as issued. 
(4) A person who notifies a transferee beneficiary of the terms of a letter of 
credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice has the rights and obligations of an 
adviser under Subsection (3). The terms in the notice to the transferee 
beneficiary may differ from the terms in any notice to the transferor benefi-
ciary to the extent permitted by the letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, 
or advice received by the person who so notifies. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-107, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 5-107, 
1997, ch. 241, § 9. relating to advice of credit and confirmation, 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws and enacts the present section, effective July 1, 
1997, ch. 241, § 9 repeals former § 70A-5-107, 1997 
70A-5-108. Issuer's rights and obligations. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-5-109, an issuer shall honor 
a presentation that , as determined by the s tandard practice referred to in 
Subsection (5), appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the letter of credit. Except as otherwise provided in Section 
70A-5-113 and unless otherwise agreed with the applicant, an issuer shall 
dishonor a presentation that does not appear so to comply. 
(2) An issuer has a reasonable t ime after presentation, but not beyond the 
end of the seventh business day of the issuer after the day of its receipt of 
documents: 
(a) to honor; 
(b) if the letter of credit provides for honor to be completed more than 
seven business days after presentation, to accept a draft or incur a 
deferred obligation; or 
(c) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the presentation. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), an issuer is precluded 
from asserting as a basis for dishonor any discrepancy if timely notice is not 
given, or any discrepancy not stated in the notice if timely notice is given. 
(4) Failure to give the notice specified in Subsection (2) or to mention fraud, 
forgery, or expiration in the notice does not preclude the issuer from asserting 
as a basis for dishonor fraud or forgery as described in Subsection 70A-5-109(1) 
or expiration of the letter of credit before presentation. 
(5) An issuer shall observe s tandard practice of financial institutions that 
regularly issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of the 
s tandard practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall 
offer the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the standard 
practice. 
(6) An issuer is not responsible for: 
(a) the performance or nonperformance of the underlying contract 
arrangement, or transaction; 
(b) an act or omission of others; or 
(c) observance or knowledge of the usage of a particular t rade othei 
than the s tandard practice referred to in Subsection (5). 
(7) If an undertaking constituting a letter of credit under Subsection 
70A-5-102(10) contains nondocumentary conditions, an issuer shall disregard 
the nondocumentary conditions and treat them as if they were not stated. 
(8) An issuer that has dishonored a presentation shall return the documents 
or hold them at the disposal of, and send advice to that effect to, the presenter. 
(9) An issuer that has honored a presentation as permitted or required by 
this chapter: 
(a) is entitled to be reimbursed by the applicant in immediately 
available funds not later than the date of its payment of funds; 
(b) takes the documents free of claims of the beneficiary or presenter; 
(c) is precluded from asserting a right of recourse on a draft under 
Sections 70A-3-414 and 70A-3-415; 
(d) except as otherwise provided in Sections 70A-5-110 and 70A-5-117, 
is precluded from restitution of money paid or other value given by 
mistake to the extent the mistake concerns discrepancies in the docu-
ments or tender which are apparent on the face of the presentation; and 
(e) is discharged to the extent of its performance under the letter of 
credit unless the issuer honored a presentation in which a required 
signature of a beneficiary was forged. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-108, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5-108, 
1997, ch. 241, § 10. relating to notation credit, and enacts the 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws present section, effective July 1, 1997 
1997, ch. 241, § 10 repeals former § 70A-5-108, 
70A-5-109- Fraud and forgery. 
(1) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with 
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is 
forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a 
material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant: 
(a) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by: 
(i) a nominated person who has given value in good faith and 
without notice of forgery or material fraud; 
(ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith; 
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of 
credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated 
person; or 
(iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's deferred 
obligation that was taken for value and without notice of forgery or 
material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or 
nominated person; and 
(b) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presen-
tation in any other case. 
(2) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially 
fraudulent or that honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud 
by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction 
may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presenta-
tion or grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons only if the court 
finds that: 
(a) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted 
draft or deferred obligation incurred by the issuer; 
(b) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely 
affected is adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the 
relief is granted; 
(c) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of 
this state have been met; and
 K M _ , 
(d) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant 
is more likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material 
fraud and the person demanding honor does not qualify for protection 
under Subsection (l)(a). 
History: C. 1953,70A-5-109, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 5-109, 
1997, ch. 241, § 11. describing an issuer's obligation to its cus-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws tomer, and enacts the present section, effective 
1997, ch 241, § 11 repeals former § 70A-5-109, July 1, 1997 
70A-5-110. Warranties. 
(1) If its presentation is honored, the beneficiary warrants: 
(a) to the issuer, any other person to whom presentation is made, and 
the applicant that there is no fraud or forgery of the kind described in 
Subsection 70A-5-109U); and 
(b) to the applicant that the drawing does not violate any agreement 
between the applicant and beneficiary or any other agreement intended by 
them to be augmented by the letter of credit. 
(2) The warranties in Subsection (1) are in addition to warranties arising 
under Title 70A, Chapter 3, Negotiable Instruments, Chapter 4, Bank Deposits 
and Collections, Chapter 7, Documents of Title, and Chapter 8, Investment 
Securities, because of the presentation or transfer of documents covered by any 
of those chapters. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-110, enacted by L. as enacted by La*s 1965, ch 154, § 5 110, 
1997, ch. 241, § 12. relating to availability of credit in portions, and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws enacts the present section, effective JuK 1, 
1997, ch 241, § 12 repeals former § 70A-5-110, 1997 
70A-5-111. Remedies. 
(1) If an issuer wrongfully dishonors or repudiates its obligation to pay 
money under a letter of credit before presentation, the beneficiary, successor, or 
nominated person presenting on its own behalf may recover from the issuer the 
amount that is the subject of the dishonor or repudiation. If the issuer's 
obligation under the letter of credit is not for the payment of money, the 
claimant may obtain specific performance or, at the claimant's election, recover 
an amount equal to the value of performance from the issuer. In either case, 
the claimant may also recover incidental but not consequential damages. The 
claimant is not obligated to take action to avoid damages that might be due 
from the issuer under this Subsection (1). If, although not obligated to do so, 
the claimant avoids damages, the claimant's recovery from the issuer must be 
reduced by the amount of damages avoided. The issuer has the burden of 
proving the amount of damages avoided. In the case of repudiation the 
claimant need not present any document. 
(2) If an issuer wrongfully dishonors a draft or demand presented under a 
letter of credit or honors a draft or demand in breach of its obligation to the 
applicant, the applicant may recover damages resulting from the breach, 
including incidental but not consequential damages, less any amount saved as 
a result of the breach. 
(3) If an adviser or nominated person other than a confirmer breaches an 
obligation under this chapter or an issuer breaches an obligation not covered 
in Subsection (1) or (2), a person to whom the obligation is owed may recover 
damages resulting from the breach, including incidental but not consequential 
damages, less any amount saved as a result of the breach. Tb the extent of the 
confirmation, a confirmer has the liability of an issuer specified in this 
Subsection (3) and Subsections (1) and (2). 
(4) An issuer, nominated person, or adviser who is found liable under 
Subsection (1), (2), or (3) shall pay interest on the amount owed thereunder 
from the date of wrongful dishonor or other appropriate date. 
(5) Reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation must be 
awarded to the prevailing party in an action in which a remedy is sought under 
this chapter. 
(6) Damages tha t would otherwise be payable by a party for breach of an 
obligation under this chapter may be liquidated by agreement or undertaking, 
but only in an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the harm 
anticipated. 
History: C. 1953,70A-5-111, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 5-111, 
1997, ch. 241, § 13. relating to warranties on transfer and present-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws ment, and enacts the present section, effective 
1997, ch. 241, § 13 repeals former § 70A-5-111, July 1, 1997. 
70A-5-112. Transfer of letter of credit. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-5-113, unless a letter of 
credit provides tha t it is transferable, the right of a beneficiary to draw or 
otherwise demand performance under a letter of credit may not be transferred. 
(2) Even if a letter of credit provides that it is transferable, the issuer may 
refuse to recognize or carry out a transfer if: 
(a) the transfer would violate applicable law; or 
(b) the transferor or transferee has failed to comply with any require-
ment stated in the letter of credit or any other requirement relating to 
transfer imposed by the issuer which is within the standard practice 
referred to in Subsection 70A-5-108(5) or is otherwise reasonable under 
the circumstances. 
History: C. 1953,70A-5-112, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 5-112, 
1997, ch. 241, § 14. relating to time allowed for dishonor and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws rejectment, and enacts the present section, ef-
1997, ch. 241, § 14 repeals former § 70A-5-112, fective July 1, 1997. 
70A-5-113. Transfer by operation of law, 
(1) A successor of a beneficiary may consent to amendments, sign and 
present documents, and receive payment or other items of value in the name 
of the beneficiary without disclosing its status as a successor. 
(2) A successor of a beneficiary may consent to amendments, sign and 
present documents, and receive payment or other items of value in its own 
name as the disclosed successor of the beneficiary. Except as otherwise 
provided in Subsection (5), an issuer shall recognize a disclosed successor of a 
beneficiary as beneficiary in full substitution for its predecessor upon compli-
ance with the requirements for recognition by the issuer of a transfer of 
drawing rights by operation of law under the standard practice referred to in 
Subsection 70A-5-108(5) or, in the absence of such a practice, compliance with 
other reasonable procedures sufficient to protect the issuer. 
(3) An issuer is not obliged to determine whether a purported successor is a 
successor of a beneficiary or whether the signature of a purported successor is 
genuine or authorized. 
(4) Honor of a purported successor's apparently complying presentation 
under Subsection (1) or (2) has the consequences specified in Subsection 
70A-5-108(9) even if the purported successor is not the successor of a 
beneficiary. Documents signed in the name of the beneficiary or of a disclosed 
successor by a person who is neither the beneficiary nor the successor of the 
beneficiary are forged documents for the purposes of Section 70A-5-109 
(5) An issuer whose rights of reimbursement are not covered by Subsection 
(4) or substantially similar law and any confirmer or nominated person may 
decline to recognize a presentation under Subsection (2). 
(6) A beneficiary whose name is changed after the issuance of a letter of 
credit has the same rights and obligations as a successor of a beneficiary under 
this section. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-113, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5-113, 
1997, ch. 241, § 15. relating to indemnities, and enacts the present 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws section, effective July 1, 1997 
1997, ch 241, § 15 repeals former § 70A-5-113, 
70A-5-114. Assignment of proceeds. 
(1) In this section, "proceeds of a letter of credit" means the cash, check, 
accepted draft, or other item of value paid or delivered upon honor or giving of 
value by the issuer or any nominated person under the letter of credit The 
term does not include a beneficiary's drawing rights or documents presented by 
the beneficiary. 
(2) A beneficiary may assign its right to part or all of the proceeds of a letter 
of credit. The beneficiary may do so before presentation as a present assign-
ment of its right to receive proceeds contingent upon its compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the letter of credit. 
(3) An issuer or nominated person need not recognize an assignment of 
proceeds of a letter of credit until it consents to the assignment. 
(4) An issuer or nominated person has no obligation to give or withhold its 
consent to an assignment of proceeds of a letter of credit, but consent may not 
be unreasonably withheld if the assignee possesses and exhibits the letter of 
credit and presentation of the letter of credit is a condition to honor. 
(5) Rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent 
of the beneficiary's assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are 
superior to the assignee's right to the proceeds. 
(6) Neither the rights recognized by this section between an assignee and an 
issuer, transferee beneficiary, or nominated person nor the issuer's or nomi-
nated person's payment of proceeds to an assignee or a third person affect the 
rights between the assignee and any person other than the issuer, transferee 
beneficiary, or nominated person. The mode of creating and perfecting a 
security interest in or granting an assignment of a beneficiary's rights to 
proceeds is governed by Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform Commercial Code — 
Secured Transactions, or other law. Against persons other than the issuer, 
transferee beneficiary, or nominated person, the rights and obligations arising 
upon the creation of a security interest or other assignment of a beneficiary's 
right to proceeds and its perfection are governed by Title 70A, Chapter 9a, 
Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions, or other law. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-114, enacted by L. the present section, effective July 1, 1997 
1997, ch. 241, § 16; 2000, ch. 252, § 29. Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
 m e n t , effective July 1,2001, added "Chapter 9a, 
1997, ch. 241, § 16 repeals former § 70A-5-114, Uniform Commercial Code* twice in Subsection 
as last amended by Laws 1996, ch. 204, § 6, (g). 
concerning right to reimbursement, and enacts 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. —Applicability of waiver or estoppel under letter of credit under UCC § 5-114, 53 
to preclude claim of nonconformance of docu- A L R 5th 667 
ments as ground for dishonor or presentment 
70A-5-115. Statute of l imitations. 
An action to enforce a right or obligation arising under this chapter must be 
commenced within one year after the expiration date of the relevant letter of 
credit or one year after the cause of action accrues, whichever occurs later. A 
cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved 
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-115, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5-115, 
1997, ch. 241, § 17. relatmg to remedy for improper dishonor, and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws enacts the present section, effective July 1, 
1997, ch 241, § 17 repeals former § 70A-5-115, 1997 
70A-5-116. Choice of law and forum. 
(1) The liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser for action or 
omission is governed by the law of the jurisdiction chosen by an agreement in 
the form of a record signed or otherwise authenticated by the affected parties 
in the manner provided in Section 70A-5-104 or by a provision in the person's 
letter of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking The jurisdiction whose law 
is chosen need not bear any relation to the transaction. 
(2) Unless Subsection (1) applies, the liability of an issuer, nominated 
person, or adviser for action or omission is governed by the law of the 
jurisdiction in which the person is located. The person is considered to be 
located a t the address indicated in the person's undertaking. If more than one 
address is indicated, the person is considered to be located a t the address from 
which the person's undertaking was issued. For the purpose of jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and recognition of interbranch letters of credit, but not enforce-
ment of a judgment, all branches of a bank are considered separate juridical 
entities and a bank is considered to be located at the place where its relevant 
branch is considered to be located under this Subsection (2). 
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection (3)(a), the liability of 
an issuer, nominated person, or adviser is governed by any rules of custom 
or practice, such as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits, to which the letter of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking is 
expressly made subject. 
(b) If this chapter would govern the liability of an issuer, nominated 
person, or adviser under Subsection (1) or (2): 
(i) the relevant undertaking incorporates rules of custom or prac-
tice; and 
(ii) there is conflict between this chapter and those rules as applied 
to tha t undertaking, those rules govern except to the extent of any 
conflict with the nonvariable provisions specified in Subsection 70A-
5-103(3). 
(4) If there is conflict between this chapter and Title 70A, Chapter { 
^Commercial Paper, Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, Chapter 4i 
Funds Transfers, or Chapter 9, Secured Transactions, this chapter governs. 
(5) The forum for settling disputes arising out of an undertaking within thi 
chapter may be chosen in the manner and with the binding effect tha 
governing law may be chosen in accordance with Subsection (1). 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-116, enacted by L. as last amended by Laws 1977, ch 272, § ( 
1997, ch. 241, § 18. relating to transfer and assignment, and enact 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws the present section, effective July 1, 1997 
1997, ch 241, § 18 repeals former § 70A-5-116, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and applica-
tion of the uniform customs and practice for 
documentary credits (UCP), 56 A L R 5th 565 
70A-5-117. Subrogation of issuer, applicant, and nomi 
nated person. 
(1) An issuer that honors a beneficiary's presentation is subrogated to th< 
rights of the beneficiary to the same extent as if the issuer were a secondary 
obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary and of the apphcan 
to the same extent as if the issuer were the secondary obligor of the underlying 
obligation owed to the applicant 
(2) An applicant that reimburses an issuer is subrogated to the rights of the 
issuer against any beneficiary, presenter, or nominated person to the same 
extent as if the applicant were the secondary obligor of the obligations owed U 
the issuer and has the rights of subrogation of the issuer to the rights of the 
beneficiary stated in Subsection (1). 
(3) A nominated person who pays or gives value against a draft or demanc 
presented under a letter of credit is subrogated to the rights of: 
(a) the issuer against the applicant to the same extent as if th€ 
nominated person were a secondary obligor of the obligation owed to the 
issuer by the applicant; 
(b) the beneficiary to the same extent as if the nominated person were 
a secondary obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary, 
and 
(c) the applicant to the same extent as if the nominated person were a 
secondary obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the applicant. 
(4) Notwithstanding any agreement or term to the contrary, the rights of 
subrogation stated in Subsections (1) and (2) do not arise until the issuer 
honors the letter of credit or otherwise pays and the rights in Subsection (3) do 
not arise until the nominated person pays or otherwise gives value Until then, 
the issuer, nominated person, and the applicant do not derive under this 
section present or prospective rights forming the basis of a claim, defense, or 
excuse. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-117, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1965, ch 154, § 5 117 
1997, ch. 241, § 19. relating to insolvency of banks, and enacts the 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws present section, effective July 1, 1997. 
1997, ch. 241, § 19 repeals former § 70A-5-117, 
70A-5-118. Security interest of issuer or nominated per-
son. 
(1) An issuer or nominated person has a security interest in a document 
presented under a letter of credit to the extent tha t the issuer or nominated 
person honors or gives value for the presentation. 
(2) So long as and to the extent that an issuer or nominated person has not 
been reimbursed or has not otherwise recovered the value given with respect 
to a security interest in a document under Subsection (1), the security interest 
continues and is subject to Chapter 9, but: 
(a) a security agreement is not necessary to make the security interest 
enforceable under Subsection 70A-9a-203(2)(c); 
(b) if the document is presented in a medium other than a written or 
other tangible medium, the security interest is perfected; and 
(c) if the document is presented in a written or other tangible medium 
and is not a certificated security, chattel paper, a document of title, an 
instrument , or a letter of credit, the security interest is perfected and has 
priority over a conflicting security interest in the document so long as the 
debtor does not have possession of the document. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-118, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1997, ch. 241, § 20, describ-
2000, ch. 252, § 30. ing the applicability of the chapter, and enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws the present section, effective July 1, 2001. 
2000, ch. 252, § 30 repeals former § 70A-5-118, 
70A-5-119. Applicability. 
This act applies to a letter of credit that is issued on or after July 1, 1997. 
This act does not apply to a transaction, event, obligation, or duty arising out 
of or associated with a letter of credit that was issued before July 1, 1997. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-5-119, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act." — Laws 2000, ch, 
2000, ch. 252, § 31. 252 repeals Chapter 9 of this title, enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws Chapter 9a of this title, and makes conforming 
2000, ch 252, § 31 repeals former § 70A-5-119, changes throughout the Utah Code. In context, 
as enacted by Laws 1997, ch 241, § 21, a however, the term "this act," as used in this 
savings clause for transactions before the en- section, probably means "this chapter," espe-
actment of this chapter, and enacts the present cially since this section is identical to former 
section, effective July 1, 2001. § 70A-5-118. 
70A-5-120. Savings clause. 
A transaction arising out of or associated with a letter of credit tha t was 
issued before Ju ly 1, 1997, and the rights, obligations, and interests flowing 
from tha t transaction are governed by any statute or other law amended or 
repealed by this act as if repeal or amendment had not occurred and may be 
terminated, completed, consummated, or enforced under tha t s ta tute or other 
law. 
History: C. 1953,70A-5-120, enacted by L. however, the term "this act," as used in this 
2000, ch. 252, § 32. section, probably means "this chapter," espe-
Meaning of "this act." — Laws 2000, ch cially since this section is identical to former 
252 repeals Chapter 9 of this title, enacts § 70A-5-119. 
Chapter 9a of this title, and makes conforming Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 
changes throughout the Utah Code. In context, 177 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001. 
CHAFTKK 6 
BULK SALES [REPEALER 
70A-6-101 to 70A-6-111. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1996, ch. 42, § 2 repeals as enacted by L. 1965, ch. 154, § 6-111, provi 
§§ 70A-6-101 to 70A-6-110, as last amended by ing for limitation of actions and levies, effectr 
L. 1990, ch. 294, § 42 and L. 1991, ch. 5, § 78 April 23, 1990. 
and as enacted by L. 1990, ch. 294, §§ 44 to 51, Compiler's Notes. — The Title 70A, Cha 
regulating bulk sales, effective April 29, 1996. ter 6, repeal note is set out to correct i 
Laws 1990, ch. 294, § 52 repeals § 70A-6-111, omission from the bound volume 
CHAPTER 7 
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF 
LADING AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
Part 5 
Warehouse Receipts and Bills 
"of Lading — Negotiation 
and Transfer 
Section 
70A-7-503. Document of title to goods de-
feated in certain cases. 
PART 5 
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AND BILLS 
OF LADING — NEGOTIATION 
AND TRANSFER 
70A-7-503. Document of title to goods defeated in certai 
cases. 
(1) A document of title confers no right in goods against a person who befo 
issuance of the document had a legal interest or a perfected security intere 
in them and who neither: 
(a) delivered or entrusted them or any document of title covering the 
to the bailor or his nominee with actual or apparent authority to shi 
store or sell or with power to obtain delivery under this chapter (Secti< 
70A-7-403) or with power of disposition under this act (Sections 70A-2-4< 
and 70A-9a-320) or other s ta tute or rule of law; nor 
(b) acquiesced in the procurement by the bailor or his nominee of ai 
document of title. 
(2) Title to goods based upon an unaccepted delivery order is subject to tl 
rights of anyone to whom a negotiable warehouse receipt or bill of ladii 
covering the goods has been duly negotiated. Such a title may be defeat 
under the next section to the same extent as the rights of the issuer or 
transferee from the issuer. 
(3) Title to goods based upon a bill of lading issued to a freight forwarder 
subject to the rights of anyone to whom a bill issued by the freight forward 
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you remember? 
A Let's see. I went to that department in 
1969. So around '70, '71. 
Q And what was your next position with 
(National Savings Trust? 
A My boss was promoted to president. And I 
(worked as his executive secretary. 
0 And how long did you have that position? 
A Shortly after that, he was also made 
[chairman of the board. And I was his executive 
(secretary until 1984. 
Q And what happened then? 
A Then he retired and I was transferred to 
|the trust area, Trust Department. 
Q Okay. When you were executive secretary 
[for the president of the National Savings Trust, who 
|then became chairman of the board, what were your 
responsibilities? 
A Executive duties, secretarial duties. 
(Basically, writing letters, preparing documents for 
lloans, and that sort of thing, and ratifying minutes 























Q Okay. And over what period of time did you 
(serve as trainee in that position? 
A I was at that particular office for almost 
[two years. 
Q And what was your next position after being 
[trainee as branch manager? 
A I was then sent to the United Unions branch 
(as the manager at 1750 New York Avenue. 
Q And what did you call that branch? I am 
|sorry. 
A United Unions. It was basically a branch 
for the unions in the building. 
Q And what was your next position? 
A I was then transferred back to the main 
[office at 15th and New York Avenue as the manager. 
Q Over what period of time were you the . 
Manager of that office? 
A Probably about four or five months. 
Q Okay. Let's back up a second. When you 
[were a trainee to the branch manager initially in 
1990, what were your responsibilities? 
A I was serving as the assistant manager. 







(also the sec 














And after you were transferred to the Trust 
n about 1984, what were your 
ties? 
I was the trust administrative person. And 
over — I was overseeing all the 
ve responsibilities of the trust, 
rd processing and mail distribution and 
retary to the Trust Committee. I would 
ke the minutes and prepare them for the 
and for the board meetings. 
Okay. And how long were you in that 
Six years. 
And that takes us to about when? About 
us a 
Uh-huh. 
And what was your next position? 
I was then transferred to Branch Management 
And was this still with National Savings 























Q And what did that involve? 
A Waiting on customers, basically opening new 
[accounts, doing the overdraft list, approving checks, 
(and those kinds of things, reviewing reports. 
Q All right. After you became manager of the 
(United Unions Branch, what were your 
{responsibilities? 
A Basically, overseeing the branch. I was 
(given assigned goals, and I had to meet my goals and 
bake sure that the branch was operating in the proper 
auditing procedures~and still opening new accounts, 
Isales, and that sort of thing, but no lending 
(authority. 
Q Up to that point in time, had you ever had 
|any lending authority? 
A No, I never had that at a bank. 
0 At any time? 
A At any time. 
Q You have never been a loan officer? 
A No. 
Q After you transferred back to the main 
(office as a manager or as manager, what were your 
Page 15 Page 18 
thereafter became Crestar Bank. 
Q Do you remember about when that was that 
JUVB acquired National Savings Trust? 
A It was either 1986 or '87. 
Q So during the time that you were in the 
administrative position, UVB actually owned the p u s t 
Ibank? 
Yes. A 
Q Did your former boss retire at the time of 
[the acquisition by Crestar Bank — by UVB, I mean? 
A He actually retired prior to that. I think 
[the acquisition really wasn't until about two years 
later. 
Q And which branch did you work at as a 
(trainee in 1990? 
A I worked at the main office, which was at 
15th and New York Avenue. 
Q And this would be the main office of United 
[Virginia Bank at that time? 
A It wasn't the main office of United 

























A Basically, the same as, you know, at 












ng procedures were being followed and 
, customer service, managing employees. 
What was your next position? 
I was then transferred to the Georgetown 
And what's the address there? 
30th and M. 
When were you transferred to the Georgetown 1 
May of '95. 
Was there any particular reason for that 
transfer that you were aware of? | 
A They wanted — they were needing a branch 






me to a higher asset branch. 1 
And what were, your duties and \L 
ities as branch Tanager of the Georgetown 4 
Basically the same, making sure that the | 
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>ranch was following auditing procedures, managing 
MnployCTrgT-frpecaf 10P,*i " * » « g » . r K , <*in»<uiM»r ^ r i / i r a , 
5pen1ng new accounts. ~ ~~-
" 0? And~when you say sales goals, what do you 
iiean by that? 
A Each branch is assigned revenue dollars 
that have to be earned. And we would have certain 
amounts of dollars for particular accounts that we 
opened, and we were assigned basically, depending on 
the market area whether we were successful in doing 
equity loans or commercial accounts, you know, to 
meet our goals. And the goals were set according to 
the assets of the branch. 
Q I take tt from your prior answer that after 
*ou were manager of the Georgetown branch, you still 
[had no_lenduig_AUJLhoxity7 
A No lending. 
Q And at that position, did you have any 
[authority to commit the bank to expend U s own funds 
khrough loans or guarantees or letters of credit or 
(other instruments7 























[her at any time7 
A Other than actually meeting her. And then 
[there was an incident where she became upset with 
fell da regarding having to complete a currency 
[transaction report. 
Q What was that incident7 — 
A If a customer comes in and cashes checks 
(totalling over $10,000, we have to complete a report 
for the IRS. And basically, it is to see if people 
pre laundering money. And she became very upset with 
fcilda because Gilda did not advise her that this 
pould transpire and would require additional 
information from her. And she was very upset with 
(Gilda and then later called me to explain that she 
should have been informed that this would be done if 
Ishe cashed checks m excess of $10,000. 
Q And what did you do about that7 
A Well, basically, she was very upset. And I 
(apologized to her for not being informed. And she _ 
said at the time that she would probably close her 
(accounts. 
0 And what about the forms themselves7 Did 
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Q Now, what was your next position, if any, 




A I retired. "\ 
I am 
sorry 
Q And wKerPdid you retire7 
A September of '99 or was it '987 
It had to be '98, I guess, yeah 
Q Now, I want to ask you a little bit about 
the facts that bring us here today Of course, you 
ire aware that you were sued along with Crestar Bank 
|by Wesley Sine in a case out in Utah, correct7 
A That is correct. 
Q And Ms. Rita Mangiapane or Rita Josephine 
Hangiapane and the Diana Group, Inc were also named 
|as defendants in that case. Are you aware of that7 
A Yes, I am. 
Q Now, I want to ask you when you first 
became acquainted with Ms Mangiapane or the Diana 
|Group, Inc 7 
A Gilda Davis, who is my customer service 
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representative at Georgetown, introduced me to her 
and classified her as a preferred banking customer of 
high net worth. And basically, she was a good 
(customer. 
Q And who was Gilda Davis at the time or what 
(was her position7 
A She was a customer service representative. 
Q Did Ms. Mangiapane have a personal account 
[at the branch or a business account for her company 
[Diana Group? 
A When I first arrived, she had business 
[accounts. And I am not really sure about this. But 
she may have been on a joint account with 
Hr. Mitchell. 
Q And did Ms. Mangiapane have a business 
[account in the name of Diana Group or more than one 
[account for Diana Group? 
A There were several accounts when I first 
}ot there for Diana Group. 
Q At the lme that Gilda Davis told you about 
H s . Mangiapane and Diana Group, did you have any 












































[you explain to her that that was a government 
requirement7 
A Yes, I did explain that this had to be 
[completed for anyone that came in there. And that 
kven though a person would go from one branch to 
another, each transaction was counted for the day as 
|a total regardless of where they went. And this had 
to be done because it totals in the system whenever a 
[customer would exceed the $10,000. 
Q And is that a form or a documentation that 
the bank does or that the customer does 7 
A No. It is done by both. We actually 
[request information from the customer to be completed 
|on a form and then we submit it. 
Q Did Ms. Mangiapane object to providing that 
information7 __ 
A Yes, she did. She was very upset and did 
[not want to provide So we completed it as much as 
Le could with the information that we had, but it had 
[to be submitted because it is the law — a bank law. 
Q~ And I take it, then, you followed the law 
Ion that7 ~~" 
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A^ Oh^ 
Q Now, what were your next dealings with 
if dj)y, with Ms. Mangiapane? 
A Well, because of the misunderstanding with 
(Gilda, she started to come to me for her banking 
peeds. And basically, I, you know, would cash her 
(checks for her and try to give her good service. 
Q You weren't a teller at the time, were you? 
A No. 
Q And so when she came in to cash a check, 
[why would there be^ny-neeo^o^y$i*~taJ*e_involved in 
[that7 ^ ^ ^ 
A Well, we always try to give-our preferred 
[customers the excellence service. And I had several 
pthex rustnmers that 4—did this tor as w e n > *rto* 
basically, they would come over and bring their 
Checks. And if they were drawing on Crestar, they 
^ould, you know, issue the check. And I would take 
it behind the line personally and get then the money 
(and bring it back. 
Q All right. And were there any occasions 
[when some sort of approval was required for checks of 
SINE' CREE-JOHNSON AUGUST 30, zow XHAAl**/Oj 
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A Mr. Sine cancelling it, yes. 
MS. POWELL: Let me just ask you to look at 
[what has previously been marked as Exhibit 7 in 
Hs. Mangiapane's deposition, which I will ask the 
jreporter to mark as Exhibit 3 m deposition. 
(Exhibit No. 3 - Sine Letter 
3/12/98. marked for identification.) 
BY MS. POWELL: 
Q This is a letter from Mr. Sine's files, not 
jfrom the bank files or Ms. Mangiapane's files. But 
can you tell whether this 1s the letter that she 
(showed you or not or do you remember? 
A It looks similar. I can't say for sure 
[this 1s the exact one because I can't remember, to be 
honest with you. But the wording was basically that 
[the transaction was being cancelled. 
Q Okay. So the important part of whatever 
jthe letter was that she showed you was to the effect 
(that it was cancelled7 
A Yeah. She just wanted to let me know that 
(this was not going to happen. 























litigation, okay. It is not anything from the bank's 
files, but from his files after he filed suit. But I 
want you to look at the second page of Exhibit 4, 
which appears to be a copy of a letter, dated March 
(24, 1998, from you at Crestar to Wesley Sine, 
reference Bank of Utah, account holder Wesley F. 
Sine, attorney at law, fiduciary and Trust Account 
|No. 12036086; Bank Officer, Oave Taylor. 
Does this appear to be a copy of or similar 
[to a letter that you sent to Mr. Sine at 
Hs. Mangiapane's request? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q And the amounts shown in this letter are 
jthat Mr. Sine would deposit $500,000 to Oiana Group's 
escrow account and Diana Group would transfer to him 
$2,500,000. Do you recall those as being the numbers 
[that were in the letter that you sent7 
A Yes. 
Q When Ms. Mangiapane asked you to write the 
jletter of March 24, did she have with her the 
February 6 letter or the wording to give you for this 
|one as well, or did you pull out the February 6 
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[was or how )ong after the February 6 letter that was7 
A Not really. I just — it may have been a 
few weeks or maybe a month or so. I can't really 
recall the exact time. I do remember her telling me 
[that. 
Q Okay. And did there come a time when she 
[asked you — Ms. Mangiapane asked you to write 
another letter — a similar letter with different 
[amounts in it7 
A Yes. She said they had had a new amount 
that he could -- actually had pulled together and 
that — and asked me to write the second letter 
hanging the amounts 
Q Did she tell you that it was still in 
[connection with this same matter involving treasuries 
in the amount of $500 million or was this a different 
fatter7 
A It was — I don't recall her telling me 
[anything different other than it was still the same 
[transaction, only a smaller amount. 
Q And in between the time that you wrote the 























letter7 How did that work7 
A I really can't remember exactly whether she 
|had a copy or I had my copy there or when I did it. 
Q Did you have any discussion with 
Hs. Mangiapane about the language — a discussion 
[similar to the one that you had about the February 6 
letter? 
A Well, basically, you know, that this was 
[not a bank guarantee and the bank wouldn't be held 
accountable. So I pretty muchy you know, was assured 
[that there shouldn't be a problem. 
Q Did she tell you that this letter was 
required because of her arrangement with Mr. Sine and 
Iher escrow account arrangement that she had with 
)Hr. Sine7 
A She may have repeated it. I can't recall 
[the exact conversation. But she said he is fully ^ 
aware that, you know, this is not a bank transaction, 
[that it is strictly between her and him, so. 
Q And other than a conversation you may have 
[had in February to verify to him that you had sent 
the February 6 letter., had you had any conversation 
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(February 6 letter at Ms. Mangiapane's request and the 
time that you wrote the second letter in March, which 
[we will talk about, werethere any other things going 
in terms of the Diana Group or their dealings with 
[the bank? 
A I can't really ^ sav. 
Q Okay. Nothing that stands out in your 
frnind? — " ~"~~ " 
No, I can't think of anything ai__tlils—tjme. 
MS. POWLLL: Now, I want to showyou next a 
(copy of what appears to be a fix cover sheet and 
letter, which was previously marked as Exhibit 11 in 
Hs. Mangiapane's deposition and which we will mark as 
Exhibit 4. 
(Johnson Exhibit No. 4 — Letter from Cree 
to Sine, 3/24/98, marked for 
identification.) 
BY MS. POWELL: 
And I want to point out to you that the 
[numbers down at tie bottom right when the S and the 
pero's and the 18 and 19 are indicate that this was a 























pith Mr. Sine at this point? 
A No. 
0 Had you had any conversations with anybody 
[connected with this transaction for Diana Group or 
[anybody else at this time? 
A No. 
Q Besides Ms. Mangiapane? 
A No. 
Q Did you show the March 24, 1998 letter to 
[anyone at the bank or seek any approval of anyone to 
(send this letter? 
A No. 
Q Did you talk to anyone about it other than 
Hs. Mangiapane? 
A No. 
Q After you sent the letter, did you hear 
from Mr. Sine? 
A Yes. He called to verify that I had 
[written the letter. And we had a very brief 
conversation. And basically, I wanted to reiterate 
fehat for my own — to protect the bank, that this was 
hot a bank transaction. And he stated he was fully 
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0 Is that the document that has a fax cover 
|sheet for the first page? 
A Yes. 
Q And the second page is the letter of 
February 6 that you said you signed? 
A Yes. 
Q Does the first page of this indicate to you 
that you sent a copy of the second page, that is, the 
[letter of February 6 to Mr. Sine by a fascimile? 
A Well, I faxed the letter to him as she 
[requested. And then the original letter was mailed. 
Q You mailed the original letter to Mr. Sine 
|or to whom? 
A Well, I know there was one instance wnere 
she actually mailed one and I mailed one. 
Q Do you know which it was7 
A No. 
Q And did you send it by U.S. Mail? 
A She normally would like to have them sent 
lovermght express. So it may have gone out FedEx or 
[something 1 ike that. 























A No, other than the fact that she would be 
(opening an escrow account with us and which meant 
[that it could be a substantial account for the bank 
and that, you know, basically assured me that this 
pas not any kind of a — the wording on it did not 
implement or implicate the bank was guaranteeing 
[anything. 
Q Do you have a recollection of that 
[conversation m your mind? 
A Well, other than that she reassured me 
[that — 
Q No. My question is, do you have a 
recollection in your mind about her coming 1n and 
talking to you about that or are you reconstructing 
it from the face of the letter? 
A No, I can't tell you verbatim. All I know 
is that she indicated to me that it had to be worded 
[this way and that in no way was it implicating the 
[bank to be guaranteeing the funds. 
Q Do you recall what you said to her? 
A No. 
Q You don't? 
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to Mr. Sine 
A 















Now, with respect to the l e t t e r of 
and I think that i s - - I b e l i e v e t h a t ' s 
Okay. 
Do you know whether you faxed this letter 
? 
I am sure — I think she said I needed to 
lm as well. I remember he called me 
er he received it. 
Okay. 
Okay. So I am sure I faxed it. 
And when you say he called you shortly, was 
minutes or within hours or within days 7 
No. It was the same day. 
Same day? 
Uh-huh. 
Was Ms. Manglapane there when he called you 
' That is, was she present with you when 
I don't recal1. 































Did she ever tell you or did you ever ask 
what the purpose of the letter was? 
A 
Q 
To open up the escrow. 
You did ask her that or did she tell you 





She told me. 
She told you that the purpose of the letter 
an escrow? 
Well, that she needed to open an account 
each client or transaction that she did and It 













and it had to be titled as such. 
And did she open an escrow account at that 
Uh-huh. 
Or was the escrow already opened? 
Well, I can't remember if she opened it 
we did open it. 
You knew there was an escrow account by 
in your bank7 
Yeah, or I wouldn't have been able to put 
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conversations that you had with Mr. Sine on the 
telephone? 
A No. I don't really remember. 
Q Okay. Do you know what happened to 
torigmal of the letter — this is the March 24 
letter? 
A Other than it being mailed or FedEx 
really can't remember exactly. 
Q You think you would have sent it to 
Mr. Sine? 
A I may have or she may have. 
Q Do you have a recollection? 
A No. 
| Q Is it possible you would have given 
copy and then sent the original to Mr. Sine? 
A That's possible. 
Q With respect to the letter, dated 
February 26 — pardon me — February 6. 
| A Uh-huh. 




























it in the letter. 
Q Right. Do you have any other recollection 
[about the origin of this letter, that is, what 
prompted you to write it other than what you have 
[already testified to? 
A No. 
Q Okay. 
MS. POWELL: The videographer says he needs 
[to change his tape. 
MR. MARSHALL: Okay. 
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. It 1s 12:02, and 
[we are going off the record. 
(A recess was held.) 
1(12 06 43) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. It is 
peg inning tape two. We are back on the record. 
BY MR. MARSHALL: 
Q Mrs. Cree9 did you ever ask Ms. Manglapane 
[about the transaction that the letter of February 6 
(related to? 
A As I told you before, she — 
Q My question was, did you ever ask her? 
A She volunteered. I mean, she told me what 










































'restar Bank filed a suspicious activity \ 
Ms. Mangiapane? \ 
Yes. \ | 
When did you become aware of that? \ 
At the time I was terminated. 
And when were you terminated? 
September sometime in '98. | 1 
Okay. And how did you become aware of it7 , 
It was discussed at my meeting. j 
At your termination meeting? 
Uh-huh. 
Who was present at the meeting besides 
Someone from our Human Resources 
Do you know the name of the attorney7 
Jean Will lams. 
Weems7 
Williams. And our regional manager, which 
I can't remember. I think it was Gene Kirby and my 1 
market manage Cheryl Shackerfort. ] 























fthe q u a l i f i c a t i o n for ret irement at the time of your 
[termination? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And do you have any present 
[relationship with Crestar Bank other than receiving 
(your retirement from them? 
A That's it. 
Q Did you say that's it? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Do you receive your retirement compensation 
|d1rectly from the bank or is it from some other fund?) 
A It is directly from the bank. It goes 
[right into my checking account. 
Q And is Crestar Bank financing your defensi 
in this case7 * 
A Yes, they are. | 
Q And are you under any obligation to repay 
[the bank for your defense7 | 
A No. 
Q No conditions? I 
A Other than I didn't criminally involve the 
(bank. 























A Basically, that I had violated auditing 
jprocedures. 
Q Did they specify how you had violated it7 
A That I should have been aware of — I can't 
remember exactly how they worded it because I was 
ivery upset. But something to the effect that I 
{should have been more cautious with my transactions 
with — 
Q Go ahead. 
MS. POWELL I just want to make sure she 
is able to finish her answer. 
BY MR. MARSHALL: 
Q Go ahead. 
A My t r a n s a c t i o n s w i th Ms. Mangiapane. 
Q So was t h i s s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d a t t h e 
[ t r a n s a c t i o n wi th Ms. Mangiapane7 
A Yes. 
Q And not other transactions7 
A No. 
Q Is that the sum of the substance of the 
























Q And are you aware that Crestar Bank filed a / 
suspicious activity report on you? / j 
! A No. / 
Q You ara not aware of that today7 / 
! A No. / 
Q Okay. Would you refer to Exhibit 8? / 
A Okay. / 
Q Now, I was a little confused before about / 
your testimony. Do you have a recollection of having / 
received that letter? I 
A No, I don't really. I don't remember it, 1 
but if I - j j 
Q Does it look strange to you? 
A It doesn't look familiar. 
Q Okay. Would you refer to Exhibit 6? Do 
you have a recollection of having received that 
letter? 
A I really can't remember. And I think if I j 
received any of them, I would have immediately called 
Ms. Mangiapane. 
Q Well, do you know — I think that what you 
are saying is that it was your customary practice if 























Q Prior to your termination at the bank, had 
[you ever had any discussions with any of your 
superiors about either the letter of February 6 or 
khe letter of March 247 
A It was after Mr. Sine had summoned me is 
when all of this was brought to conversation. 
Q After the lawsuit started? 
A Uh-huh. 
1 Q So far as you know, were any of your 
superiors aware prior to the time the lawsuit started 
that you had written the letters, dated February 6 / 1 
tend March 24? 1 
A Not to my knowledge. / j 
Q 1 see. They had never discussed it with | 
\you and you had never discussed it with them7 j 
| A No. 
Q Are you now receiving any income from 
fcrestar Bank? 
A I receive a retirement. 
Q A retirement? 
A Uh-huh. 























wou received a letter about this transaction, you 
[would call her; is that correct? 
A Well, any involvement regarding her 
[transaction with Mr. Sine, which involved me, yes, I 
Would because she kept reassuring me that this would 
[be handled. 
Q And so really it was your customary 
(practice. You don't recall specifically having a 
[conversation with her about Exhibit 6, do you? 
A I may have said, I have received a letter 
jfrom him. And she may have told me basically that, 
\you know, this would a)) be taken care of, that the 
funds would be forthcoming and I would have nothing 
[to worry about. 
Q Do you have a recollection that that 
[conversation took place, or is it just that this was 
[the usual course of dealings? 
A This was usually the course of dealings. 
Q And tell me again, do you have a 
recollection of having received that letter from 
hr. Sine? 
A I may have and 1 may have read It. And in 
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en 1n connection with getting checks or — 
A That is correct. 
0 Or what other — any kind of business 
alings at all with her that you had? 
A No, nothing more extensive than that. 
Q Did you ever try to arrange for any kind of 
tters of credit? 
No. 
Or &ny bond transfers or anything of that 
nd? 
Not with her. 
All right. 





Q Well. I'm just trying to get a feel for the 
tare of the kind of banking business that Diana Group 
d with Crestar Bank during the time that Ms. Davis 
s the account representative. 
A I have never viewed Crestar Bank as an 
istltutlon that would engage 1n business activities. I 
ive seen it more as a consumer oriented bank. Since 























laware of that. And that simply was what happened. From 
bny understanding, though, Gilda did not stay in the 
jbank that much longer anyway. 
Q Do you know approximately when this was that 
Ns. Nancy Cree first became involved with respect to 
(the Diana Group account? 
A Datewise, I can't remember when that was to 
{be frank with you. 
0 The transaction that is being, that is the 
(subject of this lawsuit was in 1998. Was it — 
A This was several years before that. 
Q Several years before that? 
A That 1s correct. 
Q Now, I'll ask you the same question with 
respect to your dealings with H^ncy Cree. Was there 
nythmg different in that than had been your dealings 
ith Crestar Bank while Gilda Davis was handling, or 
(was your customer representative? 
A Well, I recognized and felt thatJ4sJ__Cr_£e 
Jseemed to j>e a much more responsible person. She was 
fthe~authof?ty"at the ban*. And it was easier to relate 
ko her. I Just felt more"confidence in doing so. 
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nee I had had a substantial financial statement of 
t worth and dealt with other Institutions, the only 
ung that I would look to Crestar Bank for was 
'pository in the normal course of business or every 
ly consumer activities as well as a reference, as well 
the paying of bills which unfortunately they have 
opped in the manner they used to have which was 
ither convenient. But that is really the extent of 1t. 
mean I did not look to them as a repository for 
lormous amounts of money, nor anything of that nature. 
Q Did you look to other banks as repositories 
c









Yes, I did. 
Which banks were those? 
Well, Deutschebank would be one of them. 
Did Diana Group have an account there? 
It was issued an account and that was 
They did at one time have an account there7 
We didn't do anything with it, but they did 
end us account numbers, yes. 























Q And the nature of the transactions, were they 
jstill basically that Diana Group Inc. was a depositor 
(at the bank? 
A That is right. 
0 So you would have interacted with anybody who 
Las there, I guess, if you were there to cash a check 
(or to make a deposit? 
A Well, yes. But itwas obvious that every 
[time you go to cash a check M*. C r M j ^ l d have to okay 
SfT "hy g* TnTfti'ijy1 fl SM*^pfTfT?»ts FfM^f rh*w y?" 
I that checks under or over a certain 
[amount or ^rc you saying that all the checks of Diana 
(Group had to be okayed by Nancy Cree? 
A No, I really don't know what your limitations 
lire and I don't know what your internal control systems 
\are, but it seemed to me that checks which were a few 
hundred dollars still had to be okayed by her. And I'm 
{not saying that absolutely, but by and large that was a 
[factor. 
Q Were your — 
A I had never asked for special consideration. 
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~ I 
I 
A Diana Group Inc. 
Q And did there come a time when you started 
ealings with Nancy Cree at Crestar Bank instead of 
ilda Davis7 
A Yes. 
Q Was there a reason for that? 
A Yes, there was a reason for that. Gilda 
anted to withdraw money from my account, from the 
ilana account. And I wanted I want to preface this. 
tay fall back and say my account, but I'm talking 
asically of the corporate account of Diana Group Inc. 
md she wanted me to fill out a form. And I asked her 
'hat it was about. And she said that was because a 
ertain amount of money had been withdrawn which 
ollectively exceeded $10,000. And I said, well, rather 
han do that, I don't have to take that sum of money 
>ut, and I will simply take less than that and leave 
he rest in the bank and come back, even though it's a 
ittle cumbersome right now, at another date. And in so 
loing Ms. Cree got involved in that and said that she 
rould handle the matter for me. She saw that 1 was a 























I t simply is that one of the be t te r employees that 
(CreUajHw^t"tKg"t1ine was Ws. t r e e . She seemed to be 
ipt^jnorg respnr\sjiiig^She seemed to be a lot more 
e^ponsive to the c l i e n t s . 
r
 Q Did Diana Group Inc. ever have any 
(transactions in which you sought any type of funding 
[from Crestar Bank? 
A No. 
Q So you never dealt with Nancy Cree concerning 
|any type of financing by Crestar Bank? 
A Absolutely nothing. 
Q And your dealings with Nancy Cree at Crestar 
(Bank would have been solely in her capacity as the 
(person who worked at the bank and you were representing 
|a depositor at the bank? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, I want to ask you now about the 
[transaction that, or the events that form the basis for 
p i s lawsuit. And first let me ask you about the 
plaintiff, Wesley F. Sine. When did you first have any 
{knowledge of Mr. Sine or any dealings with him? 
A Early February in 19 - was 1t '98 that this 
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(assets in one company or one corporation. You try to 
(extend ownership to different entities. 
Q Were you the president and incorporator of 
St. Clair as well? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Is that a Florida corporation? 
A That was. It does not exist any longer. 
Q Did St. Clair ever derive any income? 
A No, it did not. 
Q Or have any business operations? 
A No, it did not. It was dissolved. 
Q Was Lamar International Limited Ms. 
JRoselHni's company or did you have any understanding 
(of that entity? 
A Her name and that name were associated 
(together in written correspondence; that was the 
company name that she gave. Anything about it in 
reality I don't know. I know very little about her. I 
have had several conversations with her and I really 
chose not to continue conversing with her. I found her 
(very problematic. 























said, "Why?" He said, "You have no idea what a person 
JRay Emery is like." 
"Well," I said, "so why didn't you tell me 
[that before?" And he would not talk to him any more. 
|What that was about I don't know. And that's it. 
Q So, were Mr. Emery and Mr. Rowers, I believe 
[you said they are both brokers. Is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And you are using the term "brokers" to mean 
[brokers of financing? 
A That's right, or alluding to be brokers. 
Q And Mr. Sine's role on the other hand, was 
(that different? 
A Not really. It's just that he added baggage 
|to the transaction by virtue of being this "trustee" 
for this trust, and the trust struck me as being odd 
(because this is the man who is the attorney and it is 
[yet in his name. But beyond that I had no particular 
insight. He also alluded to having sources that he knew 
f separate and apart from the activities of Ray Emery, 
[and "sources" implying sources of funding. 
Q So, as you worked your way through and worked 
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A I thought she Jived somewhere in the 
(Southwest. 
Q And her company, Lamar International, did you 
Ihave any understanding of where it was? 
A No. I really took very little interest in 
|her. 
Q Is it fair to say that once you were 
introduced to Ray Emery you didn't have further 
(dealings with Mr. Rosellini, or did you? 
A No, I spoke with her several times and, quite 
frankly, she didn't make any sense, and I thought the 
(better part of discretion would be not to talk with her 
[because I realty could not understand where she was 
coming from. Things that she said seemed to be very 
contradictory, and it occurred to me that she was not a 
[person that you could rely on. And it was just an 
instinctive thing. We did not seem to agree on anything 
land I really could not understand her. It is not that 
she didn't speak English well or something of that 
nature, but I mean I could not understand her mentality 
wr_what her interests were. To me she was a broker who 























(with these various people we have discussed, and 
focusing first now on the initial attempt to obtain $25 
hi 11 ion, what was your understanding was to be the 
source of that funding? Was it Mr. Sine's trust, or 
(other investors, or did you know? 
A I did not know because the term "trust" was 
[used ambiguously. Not until — let me take that back, 
because the letter, the initial letter that was sent 
(dated February 6 was addressed to the Sine Trust. Now, 
khat was for a transaction involving $500,000. Whether 
they meant the trust on the earlier transaction that 
Las contemplated in February and they are talking about 
(the same trust, I do not know. 
Q Did there come a time when you requested 
restar Bank to write some sort of letter with respect 
|to that $25 million transaction? 
A Yes, I did, as part of what would have been 
crrn^ATffmnf \ n^ruCXIOnTI """'" ~~ "* 
• ~~ Q And would you tell me, please, what was the 
[reason for your contact with Crestar Bank with regard 
to that $25 million transaction and what the role of 
(Crestar Bank was to be? 
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[that. And the statements that she made didn't seem to 
[be in keeping with that, but they were to a degree 
irrational to be frank with you. 
Q Who was A.M. Nardo? 
A Evidently that Is another broker. That person 
is the president or somehow associated with a mortgage 
[company, and she and Nardo seemed to be closely allied. 
Q Did you ever have any conversations with or 
(dealings with Mr. Nardo? 
A I had conversations with him. I found him a 
(very caustic, disrepectful, belligerent kind of person 
(and I didn't care to talk to him or relate to him. 
Q With respect to the initial $25 million 
financing what were the roles of Mr. Emery and Mr. 
[Flowers? 
A Well, curiously enough, after the 
introduction, what precipitated it or what ended it I 
|have no idea, but both men seemed to dislike each other 
intensely. They were both brokers. And the curious — 
land 1t really was curious after the fact, after I had 
completed this funding of $500,000 — Herman Flowers 























A Simplyan escrow agent. There was an account 
khatwas^ opened for the receipt oi funds, and the 
[ttie^ irrTication of the account number, the wiring 
ins-tructrTffhTTand the fact that the funds should be 
[transferred to that account, and the fact that when 
(funding in repayment was transferred In they would 
transfer out on a bank-to-bank basis to the designated 
(account that the trustee would provide. 
Q Now, with respect to that initial $25,000 
[amount — 
A You mean million. 
Q I'm sorry, these numbers are very large to 
ine. With respect to that initial $25 m+Hion funding, 
[what repayment arrangements did you make? 
A The repayment arrangements would be made out 
|of the large funding, which would have been the overall 
financing of the property, to inc)ude operating costs* 
|et cetera. 
Q And, focusing on Mr. Sine or his trust as the 
(source of the $25 million, what arrangements did you 
make with him In terms of what you would pay him back 
for that? 
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(have typed it on to the original? 
A No, no, he would not — I am telling you that 
I typed this. I'm assuming the responsibility for 
having that statement there. And the statement there 
k«as critically to negate his ability to take and use 
[this- for some other purpose. I mean that was the 
intent. And I have no problem saying that to you. That 
h*as the intent. 
Q Okay. Did Mr. Sine in fact wire the $500,000 
into Oiana Group's escrow account? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Was that on or about March 27? 
A I believe so. There is a bank statement which 
jwould give you the exact date. 
Q And -
A Is that corroborated by that bank statement? 
Q I don't have that before me at the moment. I 
(just have that in my notes. 
A Okay. Well, there was a document here. 
Q After the money was wired did you continue in 
[your discussions with Mr. Flowers about the funding 























And he again protested not to send it back. I 
|said, -Well, the only way that I would keep it is that 
if we enter into an operative agreement that says, 
(because," I said, "I've seen now that you, all of a 
sudden, are starting to relate to this situation in 
terms that had not been understood, anticipated, nor 
(accepted. So, I would like to have an agreement which 
fully declares Xf\e fact that this is a transaction not 
jbetween you and"the bank but between you and Diana, and 
I want to set down the terms and conditions, and that 
[there has never been a bank guranty, \i\ other words, 
|th45-Hs the operative statement tor tne transfer of 
[funds—amHrt 15 ndt be unguaranteed. * 
0 And"oTd you (n fact send Mr. Sine a document 
[to use as that agreement? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And was that document called Private 
[Placement Agreement? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Let me show you next — I have a couple of 
[versions of this. Let me show you first the one-page 
Wocument which I will ask the reporter to mark as 
il 
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A Yes. 
Q And what came of that? 
A He assured me that it was forthcoming. 
Q And I take it at some —well, it never was 
jforthcoming, was it, to you? 
A I never received it. 
Q Right. Do you know whether 1n fact he got the 
($10 million? 
A I do not know that. He stopped communicating 
Lith me. I called, I had endless calls to him. and he 
lhad a voice answering device. No matter what number I 
/called I was not able to contact him at all. 
Q After Mr. Sine wired or his group or whoever 
Lired the $500,000 to Diana Group's escrow account, 
[what communications did you have with Mr. Sine 
immediately after that? 
A Mr. Sine communicated with me and asked me to 
jhave the bank issue a bank guaranty of payment. 
Q That is of the $2,500,000? 
A That is correct. 
Q And was that on the phone that he asked you 
























(No. 14 - Private Placement Agreement 
D000070, marked for identification.) 
BY MS. POWELL: 
Q Exhibit 14 has a fax transmission indication 
Ut the top Indicating March 27 and it 1s entitled 
Private Placement Agreement. And It has some whereas 
pauses and some numbered paragraphs. And this is a 
document that came from your files. Can you Identify 
What this is? 
A This was the original Private Placement 
agreement which he subsequently amended and sent back 
ko me and I redid. 
Q And were there any terms of substance that 
Uere changed, or was it the form, or what changed? 
A Well, he did correct the fact that the funds 
mad already — as you can see, the first whereas 
relates to unencumbered funds and seeks to place said 
funds. And he corrected that to relating to the fact 
khat the funds had been sent, past tense. He objected 
rco the categories that begin each paragraph, such as 
private placement, such as amount, term, escrow 
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A That is the only way I have ever communicated 
nith him other than by fax. 
Q So this was an oral communication? 
A That is correct. 
Q And what was your response to him? 
A I told him that I did not have the abi l i ty to 
provide him wTDT a bank guaranty, that I would not__ask 
for-a—baffle guaranty, and that ho bank is ^joing to give 
ne^JianJtLojjaxajityr^ "* 
Q And what was his response to that? 
A He - this is the first time he ever really 
seriously pressed for it, and insisted that he wanted 
:hat. And so I told him that I would send him the money 
Hrectly back, instantly; but that was not part of the 
legotlatlons, nor the intention, nor anything relevant 
:o what we had as a transaction In front of us. 
Q When you offered to send him the $500,000 
>ack instantly, what was his response? 
A He said, "No. don't do that.- I said, "Well, 
ibvlously this is what you want/ and I said, "I am not 
n a position to give it, nor have I ever indicated 























[account, and so on. And, in general, that was the kind 
(of editing that he sought to have memorialized. 
Q All right. And I will show you just in a 
[second a copy of what I believe is the final version of 
khat. But in between we have a couple of letters that I 
Uant to ask you about. First is a letter dated March 
28, 1998 which I will ask the reporter to mark as 
(exhibit 15, which appears to be a three-page document. 
[The first page says it is from Oiana Group Inc. ami has 
[a signature that looks like your signature and 1s dated 
March 28. The second page is identified at the top as 
page two of March 28th letter, also with your 
[signature. And then the third page appears to be a fax 
[confirmation. 
(No. 15 - Ltr Manglapane to Sine 3/28/98 
w/attachments, marked for 
identification.) 
BY MS. POWELL: 
Q Have I identified this correctly? 
A Yes, you have. 
Q What Is this letter? 
A This letter states what I had been testifying 
